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Internal displacement and the education of  
school-aged children in Colombia 
Ximena Duenas 
Internal displacement in Colombia is a country-wide phenomenon that has affected 
almost five percent of the country’s population or 14% of the country’s rural population.  
Colombia’s violent conflict has not reached yet a post-conflict stage since no peace 
agreement has been reached between the State and violent actors. This makes an analysis 
of the effects of displacement and of the state-led initiatives relating to it, such as the 
Familias en Accion para la poblacion desplazada , highly relevant to the current status of 
this humanitarian crisis. 
Using a unique data set from Colombia, the National Survey of Displaced Households 
(ENHD) performed in 2004, this thesis examines the educational situation of displaced 
children and studies the impact of various forces, including government policy, on the 
schooling of displaced children. The dissertation investigates the following questions: 1) 
What are the main factors determining the enrollment of internally displaced children at 
the destination municipalities? 2) What is the effect associated with the participation in the 
Familias en Accion for IDPs Program on enrollment? 3) What is the prevalence of school 
overage among internally displaced children and what are its main determinants? 
With respect to the first research question, the results show that children who are 
members of a female-headed household have a lower probability of being enrolled in 
school. Conversely, children whose head of household is literate have a higher probability 
 of enrollment. The research is also able to examine the impact of how long families have 
been displaced. The results show that after a year, children’s probability of enrollment 
increases significantly, bouncing upwards relative to the period immediately following 
displacement. Finally, the results show that higher household income is associated with 
greater enrollment, but in a nonlinear way:  if a household belongs to the first three income 
quintiles the probability of enrollment does not increase significantly, but for the fourth 
and fifth income quintiles, the probability of enrollment increases by 10 and 12 percentage 
points evaluated at the mean. 
The second research question examines the effect of the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program on enrollment using a difference in differences (DID) model. The results obtained 
using the DID approach show that children whose families are aid beneficiaries are more 
likely to be enrolled in schools, holding other things constant. 
The third research question in the dissertation looks at the prevalence – and 
determinants – of school overage among internally displaced children. It is estimated that 
there are two years of overage after displacement which comes from the fact that this 
population is forced to leave their places of origin and resettle in other destinations, time 
during which children are not be able to enroll in school thus affecting their attainment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Colombia’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) are among the largest in the world. 
There are nearly two million internally displaced persons in Colombia making it the second 
country after Sudan. This figure corresponds to 4.3 percent of the country’s population and 
14 percent of the rural population1 (Giugale, Lafourcade, & Luff, 2003) 
Colombia’s violent conflict has not reached yet a post-conflict stage since no peace 
agreement has been reached between the State and some of the guerrilla groups2. With the 
amount of displaced people increasing in the country, this is a social issue of great current 
concern. The living conditions of the displaced population at their places of arrival are 
unstable because once they leave their places of origin they abandon their assets and their 
social networks thus loose leverage to alleviate the shock (Ibañez & Moya, 2006b). 
Furthermore, given the high urban unemployment rate and the low amount of human 
capital of the displaced population, their integration to the urban labor market is sluggish 
therefore they are compelled to join the informal labor market. Moreover, the impact on 
education is magnified since adverse economic conditions cause families to give priority to 
obtaining food and shelter while education is disregarded.  
This dissertation will study the factors associated with enrollment of internally 
displaced children in Colombia. The empirical analysis uses the Encuesta Nacional de 
                                                     
 
1
 There is an ongoing debate on the displaced population figures. Government sources have 1.9 million people 
registered as displaced while CODHES (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos) estimates a population of 2.2 
million between 1999 and 2005.  
2
 Peace talks have been resumed in November 2012. 
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Hogares Desplazados (ENHD), which provides household data for Colombian displaced 
families surveyed during 2004. The sample is made up of 2,322 households located in 48 
municipalities within 21 departmentos3; 1,553 are displaced households randomly selected 
using the Catholic Church’s database and 769 households are beneficiaries of USAID 
income generation programs4.  
Using this survey, this dissertation examines the educational situation of displaced 
children and studies the impact of various forces, including government policy, on the 
schooling of displaced children. The dissertation investigates the following questions: 1) 
What are the main factors determining the enrollment of internally displaced children at 
the destination municipalities? 2) What is the effect associated with the participation in the 
Familias en Accion for IDPs Program on enrollment? 3) What is the prevalence of school 
overage among internally displaced children and what are its main determinants? 
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters; the second chapter provides 
background on the two pillars of the research: Colombia’s education and internal 
displacement. The third chapter is a literature review of related research to the topic. The 
fourth chapter describes the theoretical framework used to examine the families’ utility 
maximization after displacement and enrollment of displaced children. The fifth chapter 
details the data and descriptive statistics. The sixth chapter is on the factors that determine 
enrollment at destination municipalities. The seventh chapter explores the effect 
associated with the participation in the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program. The eighth 
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 A Departamento in Colombia is the political division in the country similar to a state in the United States.  
4
 USAID income generation programs are funded by Global Communities (CHF), Fundacion Panamericana para el 
Desarrollo (FUPAD), and International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
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chapter presents evidence on the prevalence of school overage among the internally 
displaced children. Finally, the ninth chapter presents the conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 
 
This chapter provides first a discussion of internal displacement and its current 
extent. The chapter then proceeds with background on the history of the educational 
system in Colombia, up to the present, including a discussion of some of the key 
educational reforms undertaken. 
Colombia’s Internal Displacement 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1999) describes a displaced 
person as “anyone who has been forced to migrate within the national boundaries, leaving 
aside his/her residence or his/her habitual economic activities because either his/her life, 
his/her physical integrity or his/her freedom have been either violated or threatened by 
situations such as armed conflict, generalized violence, violation of human rights, and any 
other situation that may alter public order” (1999). According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not to be 
confused with refugees because they do not cross national frontiers and thus “the 
protection of IDPs, as persons displaced within their own country, is primarily the 
responsibility of the national State concerned” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2007). Additionally, “the reality has nevertheless been that 
humanitarian responses to IDP crises have overall been characterized by neglect, gaps or 
failures”(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2007). 
Humanitarian responses are sluggish because of the ongoing armed conflict or because the 
authority of the State is absent or difficult to enforce. This is what plays against victims of 
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civil conflict because they are not recognized, at least in early stages, and as the dimension 
of the conflict escalates is when IDPs gain visibility.  
Ibañez and Velez (2008) discuss that some of the underlying causes of civil conflict 
in Colombia are a result of “political confrontation, unresolved land issues since the 19th 
century and an unequal distribution of resources”. The conflict receded during the late 
1950’s because the two major political parties instilled a power sharing agreement until 
the 1970’s. However, the underlying causes remained unsolved and, during the 1960’s and 
1970’s, left-wing guerrilla movements were created to overthrow the democratically 
elected government. Due to their size, their actions initially targeted distant rural areas. 
Moreover, during the 1980’s illegal drug trade consolidated in Colombia providing funds to 
the guerrilla groups thus escalating the conflict. Furthermore, at the end of the 1980’s drug 
lords and extensive landowners created their own armed groups (denominated 
paramilitary groups) in order to protect themselves and their assets from guerrilla attacks, 
intensifying the conflict. The confrontations between the different actors that sought the 
control of territories affect people living in rural areas who end up in the middle of violent 
actions. Finally, rural families may involuntarily migrate to avoid forced recruitment of 
their children into illegal armed forces. “Children as young as eight years old are currently 
recruited by illegal armed groups to fight as soldiers in the Colombian conflict” (Salazar, 
2001).  
Internal forced migration represents, according to UNHCR 2011 figures, around 7% 
of Colombia’s population or 3.7 million people. Additionally, the UNHCR states that the 
level of risk among the IDPs “remains high due to precarious living conditions, the absence 
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of durable solutions and threats and selective killings, particularly related to the issue of 
land restitution” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). 
Furthermore, according to data on IDPs, displacement has a critical effect on vulnerable 
groups such as women, children, indigenous and afrocolombian communities (Forero, 
2003). Thus, the precarious conditions of displaced families becomes a transmission 
mechanism of intergenerational poverty that is accentuated by their rural origin and its 
demographic composition (Ibañez & Moya, 2006a) 
The state’s first attempt to recognize and give visibility to the IDPs humanitarian 
crisis was in 1997 when the government presented Law 387 and the Congress approved it. 
Although the institutional framework was established, the parties in charge of its 
implementation did not respond to it. In 2004, the Constitutional Court declared the 
unconstitutional status of the lack of implementation of policies regarding internal 
displacement. Through the Constitutional Court Sentence T-025 of 2004, a group of IDPs 
presented the corpus evidence of cases that showed the lack of implementation of the Law. 
The Constitutional Court sentence was aimed at alleviating the difficult conditions faced by 
the families’ victims of forceful internal displacement. The sentence of the Court 
established that the Law 387 agreements should be implemented as soon as possible. This 




In response to the Constitutional Court’s sentence, the State implemented the 
National System of Aid for the Internally Displaced5 in 2000 under the coordination of 
Accion Social6 which divided the state-led humanitarian response into three programs, 
protection and prevention, humanitarian aid emergency program, and socio-economic 
stabilization. Each program focuses on different phases of displacement, from early 
detection of possible displacements, attention to the recently displaced and socio-economic 
stabilization focused at giving the IDPs assistance for their permanent settlement.  
The protection and prevention program is intended to prevent the impact of violent 
actions on the population who are prone to displacement or to protect people who are 
affected by violent actions. This program works on several fronts which include the 
increasing presence of the state in conflict areas,7 the strengthening of communication 
networks in order to detect and assist communities trapped in the middle of the violent 
conflict, and strengthening of the public administration in order to improve governance. 
The entities responsible for the implementation of these strategies are Accion Social, the 
military, the police and local governments.   
The humanitarian aid emergency program is aimed at IDPs who declare their 
situation at the Attorney’s Office, which has fifteen days to validate the declaration and 
incorporate or not the person in the Registro Unico de Poblacion Desplazada - RUPD 
(Registry of Displaced Population) database as eligible for humanitarian aid. The 
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 Sistema Nacional de Atención a la Población Desplazada 
6
 Formerly called Red de Solidaridad Social 
7
 In 2002 President Andres Pastrana ended the peace talks with the FARC guerrilla which in the process granted the 
FARC around 16,000 square miles. The state’s presence increase in conflict areas was partially funded with Plan 
Colombia US aid. 
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declaration has to include information on the circumstances that caused displacement, the 
place where displacement happened, the person’s occupation, the person’s economic 
activity and source of income before displacement, and the reasons for moving to the 
destination municipality. If their reasons for displacement are valid, IDPs are eligible to 
receive government aid for up to six months. Immediately after their statement, IDPs 
receive the emergency aid8 which continues once the declared information is validated. The 
figure below shows how the local government in Cali advises IDPs the procedure to apply 
for emergency aid. This program is designed to help displaced families alleviate the basic 
needs for food, health, psychological care, shelter and emergency transportation. Families 
receive approximately USD $180 monthly for temporary housing, food and personal care 
items. Additionally, IDPs receive, once, up to USD $90 for kitchenware and house ware. 
Finally, families receive, once, up to USD $50 for transportation. From the program design 
it is evident that there are no funds destined to support children’s school enrollment but 
this does not mean that children, if families are willing, can be enrolled in school9.   
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 Throughout all the decrees that implement Law 387 of 1997 and that respond to the Constitutional Court Sentence 
T-025 of 2004 there is a caveat, IDPs will receive the emergency aid funds subject to budget availability.  
Given this caveat, it is common to see long lines of people at the Attention Unit for the Displaced (UAO) when 
funds for this program are transferred by the national government to the local ones. 
9
 To better understand how important the aid is provided by the Familias en Accions for IDPs program, the 
minimum wage in Colombia in 2004 was USD $200 so families received a minimum wage for housing and personal 
care items.  
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Figure 2-1: Steps for the IDPs in the city of Cali 
 
During the six month period, families move from the humanitarian aid emergency 
program to the socio-economic stabilization program which are a series of government-led 
initiatives aimed at providing IDPs the necessary tools for their integration to a new 
environment or plan their return to their places of origin. Socio-economic stabilization 
programs are designed as conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aimed not only at the 
internally displaced population but also at the low-income population in the country. 
Under the CCT programs there are sub-programs designed for different population groups 
such as Familias en Accion for IDPs, Familias en Accion for indigenous or afrocolombian 
population and Familias en Accion for low-income families. The Familias en Accion for low-
income families program was established in 2002 on 622 municipalities with less than 
100,000 inhabitants and with a bank. The program was initially targeted at low-income 
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people and later the Familias en Accion for IDPs program beneficiaries were integrated to 
aid scheme. By 2005 the coverage increased to 702 municipalities including those severely 
affected by inflow in IDPs during the displacement peak in 2002. By 2006 the program had 
a national coverage of close to 1,100 municipalities. The program has three components: 
education, health and nutrition. The people eligible for participating in the program 
belonged to the Sistema de Seleccion de Beneficiarios para Programas Sociales (SISBEN) 
(Selection System for Beneficiaries of Social Programs), a household welfare index created 
in 1993 used by the Colombian government to target social programs for low-income 
households10 (Garcia, 2007). In 2004 after the Constitutional Sentence T-025 the Familias 
en Accion for IDPs was created. IDPs registered in the RUPD and living in the treatment 
municipalities were assigned to the SISBEN 1 category and received aid for nutrition, 
health and education. Additionally, ID families could apply for housing aid either at the 
destination municipality or if they decide to return to their municipality of origin or 
resettle in a different municipality, this housing aid depends on the government’s funds 
availability. 
During the first six-month period in which ID households are settling down in a new 
municipality, they have to begin the enrollment process in the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program. The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program has some requirements to be met by the 
families in order to continue as aid recipients: in order to receive the education subsidy ($6 
dollars each month for each child attending primary school and $12 dollars each month for 
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 SISBEN classifies people in three categories, extremely poor or indigent (SISBEN 1), poor (SISBEN 2) and near 
poor (SISBEN 3). 
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children attending secondary school11) children between seven and seventeen years of age 
have to attend at least 80% of the classes; a nutrition subsidy ($20 dollars each month) is 
targeted for mothers with children between zero and six years of age and it is conditional 
on attending medical checkups and on mothers’ assistance to health seminars; the health 
component does not have a subsidy but families are enrolled in the national health system. 
In order to verify the compliance with the program conditions, local municipalities have to 
report to the Accion Social Agency information submitted by the schools on attendance and 
by the health institutions on medical checkups. Conversely, given the instability of IDPs 
with respect to their resettlement, Accion Social Agency has been lax with their compliance 
conditions. The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program objectives are focused on the 
following: focalization and attrition from the program, program’s relevance for IDPs and 
how well does the program respond to Law 387 of 1997 and Constitutional Sentence T-025 
of 2004 (Centro Nacional de Consultoria, 2008).  
There are several issues identified through the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program 
evaluations that have evidenced how the IDPs characteristics are special and the 
differential treatment from a policy perspective is important. For example, IDPs often move 
several times before settling on a new municipality which means that their children are 
registered at schools in different municipalities simultaneously or are out of school more 
than 20% of the allowed time. Additionally, there have been complaints about schools 
selling the certificates of attendance that cost up to 20% of the aid received by the families. 
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 If a family has a child in primary school and a child in secondary school it receives USD $18 a month that could 
represent almost 10% of Colombia’s minimum wage in 2004 which was USD $197. 
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Accion Social’s approach to displacement in 2004 was focused how to reach out to IDPs and 
being able to have a better idea of the number of aid beneficiaries. Some of the 
implementation problems are that many people have been displaced for a period longer 
than is requested by the law; people do not know of the existence of the program; people 
cannot prove that they come from a certain region affected by violent actors; and people 
are afraid of the consequences of their declaration. These issues have to be taken into 
account in the discussion because the number of IDPs is underestimated. Additionally, in 
order to be eligible for the program, according to Decree 2569 of 2000, people have to 
declare before the Attorney’s Office within a year of their displacement, otherwise they lose 
eligibility12. However, people whose displacement occurred before 1997, people who 
displaced more than once, who do not know how the process of registration works or do 
not trust the government institutions are not registered in the government aid program 
and are not considered as displaced by the state.  
Law 387 of 1997 established that parallel to the emergency aid or socio-economic 
stabilization aid, local governments should develop action plans to receive the incoming 
displaced families to their municipalities. The action plans focus on making the local 
governments responsible for having the capacity for incoming children in public schools 
and having an appropriate public health system. These two requirements address on two 
constitutional articles: children between five and fifteen years old should have access to 
free public education and the right to health. In that sense, the central government 
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 The condition of declaring within a year of displacement was removed from the requisites in 2011 because the 
resettlement process of internally displaced families takes more time and an important number of ID households 
were not being able to access the Familias en Accion for IDPs benefits. 
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transfers funds to municipalities according to the number of enrolled children in public 
schools or the capitation payment based on the number of persons affiliated to the public 
health system. It is important to note that municipalities receive the transfers destined to 
cover tuition costs or attention to patients and local governments are responsible for 
infrastructure costs. As a result, small municipalities lack the proper conditions to receive 
IDPs and this is one of the reasons why IDPs end up in larger municipalities with more 
capacity to supply their needs. Furthermore, given that Accion Social Agency selected 622 
municipalities in 2002; there is an incentive for IDPs to move to certain places once they 
know they are eligible for receiving aid. This caused a concentration of IDPs at the 
treatment municipalities exacerbating its infrastructure needs in order to attend a larger 
low-income and displaced population. By 2005, due to the peak in the number of IDPs the 
number of municipalities increased to 702 concentrated in municipalities with a high 
inflow of IDPs. By 2006 the program had national coverage.  
In the case of education, Sentence T-025 of 2004 established that forcefully 
displaced victims should be assigned to public schools without tuition, materials and 
uniforms payments during the academic calendar13. Because public education is 
decentralized in Colombia, municipalities are responsible for the programs’ 
implementation. Colombia’s education history has showed that fiscally fragile 
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 Article 19: The territorial entities shall develop special assistance programs for populations displaced by violence 
in educational matters and they shall access Social Investment Fund (FIS) subsidy program resources for basic 
education permanence and attendance.  
The National Ministry of Education and the district, municipal, and departmental Education Offices shall adopt 
special educational programs for the victims of displacement by violence. These programs shall be specialized in 
basic and middle education and they shall be carried out in less time and differently from the conventional ones in 
order to guarantee their rapid effect on the rehabilitation and productive, labor, and social interaction of victims of 
internal displacement by violence (T-025 Constitutional Court Sentence). 
14 
 
municipalities have program implementation difficulties because they do not have enough 
resources or qualified people. Even though, the central government assigns funds for this 
program but the IDPs end up in larger municipalities with better institutions and more 
opportunities. While, medium-sized municipalities should act as a buffer zone that 
prevents displacement to the densely populated cities, IDPs still move to the more 
populated, urban areas. Evidence shows that children’s enrollment has increased after 
displacement, which can be due to several factors, the program’s positive effect on 
enrollment or the increase in the availability of schooling and better security conditions at 
the destination municipalities. 
Colombia’s Education System 
 
Colombia’s education system’s history has been closely related to the country’s 
political agenda. Helg (1987) describes it as a history of lack of communication between the 
elite that advances to the rhythm of the United States and Europe and the majority of the 
Colombian population who lives isolated from the international transformation processes. 
The elite advances ambitious educational reforms that are not materialized; the urban poor 
population adjusts to the marginal changes in the system, while the rural population is not 
convinced of the benefits of education.  
The disconnection between these groups can be traced to the colonial times, which 
this chapter will review. Additionally, it aims to discuss the milestones of the primary 
education system in Colombia with special attention to the rural – urban differences. The 
overarching objective is to highlight aspects that have determined the current education 
system in Colombia and its effect on the displaced population. Education has been, until the 
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20th century, only accessible to the elite population. During the 19th and beginning of the 
20th century, the political divide between Conservatives and Liberals, swayed from a 
centralized country with education administered by the Catholic Church to a federal 
country that gave provinces the administration of laic education for all. Since mid-20th 
century industrialization, demographic growth and migration have helped consolidate a 
unified position regarding education, but implementation has not been as expected. This 
pendulum has prevented the country from consolidating an education system, thus leaving 
a gap in the quality and, as mentioned above, for some periods, in the coverage of 
education. Furthermore, lower income people mainly access the public education system, 
while private schools still represent a high entry barrier for the less advantaged14.  
This approach to education will be analyzed through a historical review of political, 
economic and social changes. The schooling system during colonial times was the basis of 
republican education; followed by education after the 1863 Constitution, characterized by 
its liberal thought imprint. The 1886 Constitution had a conservative perspective that 
remained until the 1991 Constitution.  
Nascent schools during colonial times 
 
 
During the early colonial period in Colombia, the Catholic Church, with the purpose 
of evangelization of the indigenous population, assumed a big role in education. This right 
was granted to the Catholic Church through the Royal Patronage of the Indies which was 
the regulatory mechanism between the Catholic Church and the Spanish Crown (Borges, 
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 There is a third schooling system in Colombia, similar to charter schools in the United States, schools that receive 
a yearly subsidy for every enrolled child and has created a new market of poor quality private schools.  
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1992). The first institutions of basic education in the Viceroyalty of New Granada had two 
objectives: evangelization in order to save the souls of the indigenous population; and 
consolidation of the patron – slave relationship in order to guarantee labor. Schools did not 
have the objective of educating future leaders; instead they served as a tool for maintaining 
the social order in which Spaniards held political and socio-economic control of the 
colonies. The indigenous population provided the enslaved labor for the economic 
exploitation of the colonies under the Spanish mercantilist regime.  
Two changes in the population composition led to reforms of the educational 
system: Spaniards’ children required education beyond evangelization and the diminishing 
indigenous population due to slavery exploitation. Around 1600, the Spanish Crown 
promoted the creation of schools in the main cities of the Viceroyalty, mainly Santa Fe, 
Popayan and Mompox. The schools were founded by Jesuits and Dominicans who taught 
their students spanish, religion and crafts. The first private schools established in the main 
cities during the colonial period belonged to religious orders and to some wealthy families. 
These schools admitted children of Spanish descent who came from a legitimate union 
(Catholic marriage) which made the system socially excluding. During this period the 
Catholic Church and the Spanish descent elite had the social and economic control of 
society, hence their decisions were based on   their private benefit and not on notions of 
societal welfare.  
17 
 
The Catholic Church’s control of education was removed from the religious sphere 
when in 1767 the Jesuits Order was expelled from the American colonies15 leaving the 
Spanish Crown responsible of education (García Sánchez, 2005). This was followed by a 
Royal Decree in 1768 that stated that education could not be under the dominion of either 
religious orders or the family. This educational reform gave the state responsibility for 
public education, which led to the opening of the first public schools whose duty was to 
admit all students and teach them to read, write and count.  
Transition to a Republic 
 
 
During the first half of the 19th century, the independence from the Spanish regime 
brought the education reform to a hiatus mainly because all fiscal resources were invested 
in the wars of independence and the dissolution of the Gran Colombia16. This process left 
an impoverished state with differences among the ruling elite which was divided between 
ideas of a centralized versus a federal state. Those in favor of a federal state followed the 
European model of a liberal, capitalist, dynamic and laic state.  Whereas those in favor of a 
centralized state were interested in maintaining the status quo, a static society with the 
Catholic Church as a close ally without losing the privileges obtained during the Colonial 
period (Arrubla, 1991). The country oscillated between these two initiatives at the 
beginning of the 19th century which caused political instability which, in turn, permeated 
the education system. 
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 The Jesuits Order had gained power by monopolizing education, acting as borrowers, holding an important 
amount of land, and questioning the power of the King.  
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 Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela during colonial times were the Viceroyalty of New Granada. During the 
independence it was named the Gran Colombia and after the independence it separated in three countries. 
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According to Ramirez and Salazar, some of the main reasons for the failure to 
provide universal access to education were the different views among the elite, who   were 
not able to reach a consensus on how to educate the population, and the Catholic Church – 
State tensions. Additionally, the weak fiscal conditions of the country, its geographical 
complexity, and the precarious transportation infrastructure were also negative factors. 
Furthermore, some population segments did not perceive the benefits of education because 
there was not demand for qualified labor and education was not seen as a way to ascend 
socially (Ramírez & Salazar, 2007).  
As the country defined its political agenda, educational financing was assigned to 
the provinces given the frail fiscal conditions of the national government17. Additionally, 
the national government decreed the establishment of public schools in cities or towns 
with more than 100 families and defined the learning goals of elementary education; 
students should be taught to be honest citizens, good Catholics and dexterous workers 
through knowledge of reading, writing, math, grammar, and religion. This decree 
introduced the notion of elementary education, but it did not guarantee its gratuity nor 
how it was to be financed (Helg, 1987; Safford, 1976).  
The establishment of a new education system gave the cities and towns the 
responsibility of financing schools and teachers as well as the task of assigning teachers 
using the Lancasterian18 method (Arrubla, 1991). These two elements represented the first 
approach to a decentralized system but had a negative impact on the quality of education. 
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 Around 1830, 50% of the fiscal budget was destined to the military. 
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 This method uses advanced students as instructors of the newly admitted students.  
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On one hand, towns did not have the financial leverage to incur in education expenses and, 
on the other, teachers’ availability was scarce (Patiño Millán, 2005). Therefore, 
economically disadvantaged provinces did not have sufficient funds to finance education 
which in terms of equity had serious effects on the access to and quality of education. The 
liberal government’s decentralization initiatives reached as far as the elimination of the 
percentage of the national budget allocated to education (Ramírez & Salazar, 2007). 
Furthermore, rural provinces were negatively affected by the reform as they were not able 
to provide the infrastructure and could not pay teachers’ salaries. The financial support of 
elementary education depended on the local leadership; hence its results were not 
predictable or homogeneous across towns.  
However, enrollment in elementary education during the 1830’s increased from 
17,000 in 1833 to 27,000 in 1838, which represented 11% of the school aged children 
(Palacios & Safford, 2002). A decade later, between 1838 and 1848, enrollment stagnated 
as it grew annually on average at a 0.3% rate. Rural families did not perceive the benefits of 
education and the opportunity cost of sending their children to a poor quality school versus 
having them work in the family farms was too high. Furthermore, most schools were 
concentrated in urban areas and the poor transportation system hindered the access of 
rural children to schools.  
During the 1850’s a mission led by the Ministry of Education travelled through the 
Northern provinces to study the state of education. The mission found that there was a lack 
of effective elementary instruction in the rural communities. The mission observed that 
parents refused to send their children to school because they feared that education would 
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distance the children from farming and from the rural activities they carried out (Palacios 
& Safford, 2002). Rural children had to move to cities in order to continue with their 
studies in order to obtain an equivalent degree as urban children. Rural and urban 
education also differed in teachers’ quality because qualified teachers were demanded by 
urban schools that paid higher salaries thus leaving less qualified teachers for rural 
schools. 
In 1870 the national government presented a radical reform to the educational 
system establishing that public elementary education should be free and compulsory for 
children between 6 and 14 years of age, laic, and centralized. The central government 
appointed a director of public education in every state. It also advanced the first systematic 
initiative to prepare teachers; it invited nine German teachers that were to supervise the 
normal schools19 and to implement the Pestalozzian pedagogical method20. This generated 
an increase in enrollment between 1871 and 1876, followed by a decline. The Catholic 
Church declared that families accepting the reform would be excommunicated because 
they were against Catholicism. It was such the power of their pronouncement that parents 
did not send their children to school. The Catholic Church and the Conservative party 
opposed the educational reform, and the liberal ideas associated with the government, 
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 Escuelas Normales. These schools for girls were created to train high school graduates to be teachers.  
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 Pestalozzi's method rested on two major premises: (1) children need an emotionally secure environment as the 
setting for successful learning; and (2) instruction should follow the generalized process of human conceptualization 
that begins with sensation. Emphasizing sensory learning, the special method used the Anschauung principle, a 
process that involved forming clear concepts from sense impressions. Pestalozzi designed object lessons in which 
children, guided by teachers, examined the form (shape), number (quantity and weight) of objects, and named them 
after direct experience with them. Object teaching was the most popular and widely adopted element of 
Pestalozzianism. 
Read more: Johann Pestalozzi (1746–1827) - Career and Development of Educational Theory, Diffusion of 




submerging the country in a civil war. The civil war between liberals and conservatives 
revoked the reform, schools were closed and attrition increased (Ramírez & Salazar, 2007). 











1837 1,050 26,071 148,000
1838 1,049 28,358 9% 151,000 2%
1843 1,197 26,292 -7% 163,000 8%
1844 1,203 27,124 3% 166,000 2%
1845 1,096 26,819 -1% 169,000 2%
1848 1,133 29,142 9% 177,000 5%
1850 1,119 28,821 -1% 183,000 3%
1874 1,765 84,493 193% 274,000 50%
1882 1,651 80,091 -5% 315,000 15%
1894 1,696 91,812 15% 389,000 23%
1916 347,985 279%




By 1878, the conservatives returned to power and, with counter reforms, the 
sanctions against the Catholic Church ended. The Constitution of 1886 established that 
elementary education was free but not compulsory and regulated by the Catholic Church. 
These principles were held for the following 30 years (Jaramillo Uribe, 1980) . According to 
Hubert Pöppel, Colombia’s educational system during the conservative hegemony (from 
1886 – 1930) was oriented towards “providing the lower social classes a schooling 
minimum based on catechism and memory and those belonging to the elite group attended 
well-equipped and higher quality schools although compared to international standards 
the quality was below those of industrialized countries” (Pöppel, 2000). A reform in 1927 
decreed that elementary education was compulsory but children could be educated in 
schools or by their families.  
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Public education financing was divided among the national, department and 
municipal level. According to Ramirez and Tellez’s review of memoirs of different ministers 
of education, the distribution of financial responsibilities among the three levels was 
unclear and had a perverse effect on primary education (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006). 
Moreover, the three levels were not aware of the extent of their responsibilities, which 
could be used as an excuse to minimize the investment in education.  
Also, the split of the schooling system among urban and rural schools was creating a 
wider gap in the quality of education. Urban schools had six years of enrollment at the 
elementary level, but rural schools had oly three. This allowed rural schools to have less 
financial obligations, less infrastructure requirements and, because the Catholic Church 
established that boys and girls could not attend school on the same day, schooling ended up 
being even less (almost half) than the three primary school years21. In 1931, 80% of 
elementary schools students were concentrated on the first two grades, of the 7.5% that 
reached the last three years of elementary education only 1.7% reached sixth grade which 
made it possible to continue to secondary school (Helg, 1987).  
According to Helg, during the beginning of the twentieth century, schools could be 
divided into four categories: rural schools, urban schools in villages with less than 5,000 
inhabitants, public urban schools and private urban schools. Rural schools were marginally 
funded by the municipalities which favored the schools located in the more populated 
places. Teachers in these schools were mainly women (90% according to a 1931 census) 
and poorly prepared – usually they had just finished primary school. They had to teach 
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 The Vatican recommendation to divide boys and girls lasted until 1960 
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multiple grades at the same time in densely populated classes – about 50 to 80 students. 
Multiple grades did not allow teachers to make progress with the older students. Urban 
schools in small towns were attended by the local elite, merchants and land owners, and its 
main difference with rural schools was the social status associated to attendance. The 
percentage of male teachers in these schools increased to 45% and on average all teachers 
had a normal school diploma which meant that they had studied in a capital city. Local 
government’s finances determined the infrastructure, the number of teachers, and the 
possibility to finance more than three years of primary school. Urban public schools were 
located in cities and most of them offered the six years of primary school. Public schools 
were attended by low-income students and by children of working class parents. These 
schools were supervised on a regular basis by the school inspectors so that the quality and 
the curriculum improved significantly. 
Finally, from 5% to 7% of children in the cities attended private schools. These 
children belonged to high-income families because they were responsible for tuition, 
transportation, uniforms and schooling material which increased the education costs. The 
average number of students per class in private school were 24 compared to 55 in a public 
school classroom (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006).  
Most private schools belonged to religious congregations. There were also some laic 
private schools which varied in quality, and there were some bilingual schools in the main 
capital cities. As mentioned before, the schools’ quality depended on tuition costs, some 
had better infrastructure and quality and some had buildings and teachers below the 
standards of public schools. “…experience has taught us that most families can afford this 
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amount (a five pesos monthly tuition), and for children who cannot afford it, it is not 
convenient to turn them away from entering the labor market instead of putting them on 
the path to the university, where they will increase intellectual proletariat. In fact, most of 
these students from poor families do not finish high school…” (Public Instruction Ministry 
Memoir, 1928) (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006) 
Liberals: 1930 – 1946  
 
 
Liberals assumed the presidency of Colombia from 1930-1946 and faced challenges 
in the social, economic and education fronts amid a global recession. Little could be done 
given the fragile economic circumstances and in education matters the liberal agenda was 
not distant from the conservative agenda. It was only until 1934, during the second liberal 
term, that some reforms were introduced. 
Under the name educación popular22 the reforms conceived education in a broader 
sense by stipulating that students’ good physiological conditions should be guaranteed in 
order to take advantage of education (Herrera C, 1993). The reform also established that 
10% of the GDP should be invested in education; and in four years it increased from 2.5% 
to 8%. Additional resources translated into more schools, improvements in infrastructure, 
schooling materials and better salaries for teachers, although departmentos were still 
responsible for the teacher salaries (Herrera C, 1993).  
Two years later, a constitutional reform was introduced and approved by a liberal 
majority in Congress. This education reform had three goals: “democratization, State 
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intervention and laicization” (Helg, 1987). With respect to the differences between urban 
and rural education, the latter one continued with the same deficiencies. Low enrollment 
rates prevailed, as a result of scarce resources for rural education. The academic year was 
almost half of that of the urban schools because boys and girls alternated the school days, 
and there was no connection between rural life and education (Herrera C, 1993). 
From 1916 to 1945 the number of students enrolled in primary school increased 
95% while the country’s population increased 86%23, and between 1945 and 1957 the 
number of primary school students increased 104% while the country’s population 
increased 38% (Banco de la República, 1999). In twelve years the rural – urban 
composition changed from 48% urban – 52% rural in 1945, to 60% urban – 40% rural in 
1957, and by 2005, according to census data, the urban – rural composition was 74% urban 
– 26% rural (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2008).  
Table 2 Public/Private primary school enrollment 
Urban Rural
Year Public Private Subtotal Public Private Subtotal Total
1945 295,455 32,703 328,158 347,053 3,175 350,228 678,386
1950 359,882 48,740 408,622 398,274 1,598 399,872 808,494
1953 458,534 147,185 605,719 464,674 2,143 466,817 1,072,536
1957 622,934 208,169 831,103 545,434 4,753 550,187 1,381,290
Source: Helg, 1987  
President Lleras (1945-1946) wrote that before mid-nineteenth century, the lower 
population and small scale of society allowed a permanent communication among different 
social classes; but as the so-called popular class (the masses) grew, communication 
disappeared, leaving only education as the bridge among them. Helg states that the elite’s 
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 Colombia’s population in 1916 was 5,850,193, in 1945 was 10,740,174, and in 1957 was 14,841,033. 
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indifference towards education was a deliberate mechanism to perpetuate its power (Helg, 
1987).  
The widening gap between the elite and the popular classes, and even among the 
elite, collided in a period called La Violencia (Violence) from 1948 to 1958. Much has been 
discussed about the causes and effects of this period in Colombian history. The political 
differences among conservatives and liberals flourished during this period which ended 
with a military coup in 1953 that lasted until 1958, although afterwards the country has 
been marked by new forms of violence (Crespo Razeg, 2011). Conservatives were in favor 
of a traditional, catholic and controlled society while the liberals were in favor of a laic and 
progressive society. Additionally, the country’s population had increased significantly and 
polarization between the elite and low-income people was pronounced. The murder in 
1948 of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a liberal populist presidential candidate, acted as a catalyst for 
La Violencia. With his death, the hope of thousands of Colombians was lost as he was seen 
as the advocate of change; his rhetoric was about giving the people opportunity of upward 
social mobility. After his death there were revolts in Colombia’s cities and the rebels 
targeted buildings owned by Conservatives and education institutions. Among the 
education institutions affected by the turmoil were the religious schools attended by the 
children of the political elite. The uproar against education buildings showed discontent 
against an elitist system. There was also evidence of the loss of power of the Catholic 
Church, because of its strong ties to the conservative party (Helg, 1987).  
 “The transition from a rural society to an urban one is the defining social change of 
recent Colombian history. (…) If the Colombia of 1950 could still be defined as a mosaic of 
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regions, by 1970 it was more a network of cities, more connected with each other than with 
their rural hinterlands” (Palacios, 2006). The changes in the country’s urban – rural 
configuration can have two confounding effects regarding primary education. On the one 
hand, a country with a high urban concentration makes it easier for education policy 
makers to design, implement and evaluate strategies to increase coverage and improve 
quality. On the other hand, the urban – rural gap can increase because efforts are focused 
on urban education.  
1950 to Present 
 
 
Mid-century Colombia suffered from high mortality rates, low life 
expectancy, and still low levels of urbanization. The economy was still dominated 
by agriculture, principal fount of wealth and employment, but its productivity was 
low and production techniques remained mired in the past. Migration has been the 
principal factor of urban growth. In 1950, when the country entered its most 
accelerated phase of urbanization, occupational diversification, and industrial 
expansion, Colombia still had ten students in primary schooling for each student 
who reached the secondary stage. Only one primary student in one hundred 
reached the university, and over 70 percent of students did not make it to third 
grade. With numbers like these, the shortage of trained personnel for economic 
growth was no surprise (Palacios, 2006).  
La Violencia and changes in the economic structure of the country during the 1950’s 
boosted the rural to urban migration process, which impacted the education sector. While 
La Violencia was controlled rapidly in the cities, in small towns and rural areas it endured 
for a long period and victims of persecution preferred to migrate to the cities in order to 
save their lives.  
On the economic sphere, the import substitution model adopted by the state 
stimulated the industrial, communication and services sectors over agriculture, and 
increased the demand for qualified workers in the cities. Urbanization between 1951 and 
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1964 increased from 39% to 52% (Flórez Nieto & Méndez, 2000). According to Cajiao, 
“suddenly after 1950, the country started rapidly leaping in its demographic and 
productive structures. (…) Between 1940 and 1965, the country’s population went from 
8,600,000 to 17,000,000 inhabitants, the rural population increased by 35% while the 
urban one increased 500%” (Cajiao, 2004).  
These two phenomena had a direct effect on education since the number of enrolled 
students in primary and secondary education, and the number of teachers and schools, 
increased in a considerable way (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006). The statistics presented by 
Ramirez and Tellez show that the average annual increase in enrollment for primary 
education was 7.7% during the 50’s and 6.9% during the 60’s. The ratio of primary 
students to the total population went from 7.2% in 1950 to 17% in 1976 (Ramirez & Téllez, 
2006).  
The rapid increase in demand for education strained a fragile system. The education 
sector had to respond rapidly to cope with the increasing demand, and this lowered the 
quality of education since less qualified teachers had to be hired and schools had to 
increase the numbers of students per grade.  In addition, the migrants arriving from rural 
areas came from low-income backgrounds, and the relocation disruptions made it a 
challenge for children to succeed in school. 
The public education sector had to incorporate these new demands which, 
according to Ramirez and Tellez, in the end was positive because it forced the government 
to design development plans for education instead of adjusting to the immediate needs of 
society (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006). Industrialization in the cities demanded a literate labor 
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force; therefore literacy campaigns were aimed at preparing them for work. Furthermore, 
the rural – urban transition required education policies that dealt with the needs of 
migrants and their adjustment to urban society. In this new context, schools played a key 
role in the adjustment of migrant children to urban society needs, which were to give boys 
and girls the necessary tools to participate in their social and productive environment of 
cities. Thus, until the 1960’s, education was focused on teaching civility to society and the 
use of civility handbooks was prolific (Cajiao, 2004). Finally, education was perceived as an 
instrument that permitted social mobility (Crespo Razeg, 2011).  
In spite of the advances of public education, “the system reproduced the social 
fragmentation present in the country with a public education model for the poor and 
isolated communities and a private education parallel system for the elite” (Cajiao, 2004). 
While the public education sector had to adjust to provide basic skills, the private sector 
consolidated and prepared its students for their secondary and tertiary education. The 
private education sector increased its resources and raised the supply of schools for the 
incipient middle class as it expanded in the cities, therefore being able to maintain quality, 
whereas public education had to provide education for those willing to enroll in school 
with reduced spending per student.  
During the 1960’s the public education sector continued reforms intended to 
provide better coverage and quality. In 1960, a law that centralized the primary education 
expenses on the central government was passed, while the administration of the funds 
(mainly teacher expenses) remained in the different departamentos. Additionally, in 1963 
the discrimination between rural and urban primary schooling was eliminated and it was 
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determined that primary school should have five years of schooling for both (Ramirez & 
Téllez, 2006). 
The bipartisan differences in Colombia diluted after La Violencia due to an 
arrangement between the Liberals and Conservatives to alternate the country’s presidency. 
“Though the first waves of internecine political violence were subsiding by the mid-1960s, 
new forms of violence were emerging” (P. McEwan & Benveniste, 2001). The two parties 
united in facing violence from other groups such as the guerrilla insurgencies (FARC, ELN 
and the disappeared M-19), drug dealers and paramilitaries. These illegal groups 
established in rural areas where the state authority had little or no presence. Thus, the 
political scene moved from a bipartisan confrontation to the state against violence.  
Rural – urban migration in the last decades has been labeled as displacement 
because the development of conflict in rural areas is about the territory control where the 
rural population ends up trapped in the middle of conflict having no option but to migrate 
to the cities as they are victims of violent attacks.  
The rural – urban educational gap did not diminish during the 1960’s, as the 
government planned. The lack of teachers still played against the decree. Teachers had to 
teach multi-grade classes which made it very difficult for students to advance to higher 
grades. Primary schooling continued to be held for three years in rural areas. The 
government evaluations of rural public primary schooling showed problems in quality, 
coverage and resources, which widened the gap between rural and urban education. In 
order to improve the quality of rural education, in 1976 the Ministry of Education adopted 
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the Escuela Nueva model (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006). Patric McEwan describes the model as 
follows: 
New Schools generally have one or two teachers for the five-grade 
primary cycle, promoting participatory learning and a rural-oriented 
curriculum. Students advance at their own pace and need not repeat school 
years, while communities and parents are intimately involved in their children’s 
schooling. This contrasts sharply with traditional rural education which 
emphasizes passive learning with an urban-biased curriculum and often does 
not provide a complete primary education. Schedules are rigid, so that students 
who leave to participate in agricultural activities must repeat the year. Finally, 
traditional schools have low levels of involvement in their surrounding 
communities (P. J. McEwan, 1998). 
Program evaluations of Escuela Nueva have shown positive results on bridging the 
rural – urban gap. Vicky Colbert mentions that children who attend Escuela Nueva obtain 
better results in their evaluations than children who attend traditional rural schools, 
especially in third grade and attrition decreased (Colbert, 1999), (Psacharopoulos, Rojas, & 
Velez, 1992). The resources allocated to this program showed positive results although 
they depend on the government’s priorities and as McEwan and Benveniste explain below, 
the Escuela Nueva program, as it was conceived, changed. 
As some motives waned in importance, others took their place. 
Confronted by escalating violence from guerrillas and drug traffickers, the 
State’s credibility was increasingly threatened by its lack of presence or 
authority in rural areas. Rural schools were still the only tangible evidence of 
the State in some municipalities, and their consolidation represented an 
important means of shoring up eroding legitimacy. As the State’s motives 
began to shift, however, so did the functioning of multigrade schools, which 
became increasingly decoupled. That is, the form and structures of multigrade 
schools continued to exist, but the core educational practices of multigrade 
teachers began to resemble less and less the prescribed pedagogies of the ideal 
Escuela Nueva (…) In the context of a growing crisis of legitimation, the State 
emphasized the construction of schools, rather than the altering of core 
educational practices within them. Further, Escuela Nueva was identified as an 
expensive pedagogical intervention. The State’s shifting priorities are perhaps 
best illustrated by its declining commitment to allocating necessary financial 
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resources to the program and providing teachers with the training and 
materials required to fully implement the Escuela Nueva methodology(P. 
McEwan & Benveniste, 2001). 
Even though Escuela Nueva has diverted from its initial objective, the results of the 
reform have increased the average years of schooling of the rural population. For the rural 
areas, the possibility of obtaining a primary education degree without abandoning their 
environment is very valuable because it enables the possibility of enrollment in secondary 
education.  
From 1950 to1970, the number of students per teacher went from 40 in 1951 to 30 
in 1976, mainly affected by the decrease in students per teacher in public schools that went 
from 43 to 31 in the same period while private schools remained stable at 24 students per 
teacher. Additionally, the gross enrollment ratio went from 54.5% in 1951 to 100% in 1970 
for children between 7 and 11 years of age (Ramirez & Téllez, 2006). 
Colombia’s next leap forward in education was in 1991 when a new constitution 
established the decentralization of public administration and it established education as a 
right and as a public service. Article 67 of the Constitution defines education as compulsory 
for a child between five and fifteen years of age and it is free unless parents are able to pay.  
In 1994 the General Law of Education was approved in Congress; this law 
establishes the principles for management, administration and financing of the education 
system, assigns departamentos a more important role in resource administration, and 
creates schemes for the quality of education evaluation. Additionally, it establishes that 
through the leadership of the Ministry of Education a decennial plan of education has to be 
prepared in order set the objectives of the country in education matters (Ramirez & Téllez, 
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2006). The first decennial plan was prepared in 1996 and despite a huge effort it went 
unheeded by the 1998 and 2002 president administrations. In 2006 the second decennial 
plan was elaborated with the participation of all those interested but, as in the previous 
one, its objectives were not considered in the current administration’s development plan. 
According to Ramirez and Tellez, the process of decentralization of education 
expenses is still incomplete and it remains an unfinished task during this century. First, the 
process has been disorganized and incoherent because some articles were contradictory or 
duplicate. Second, the decentralization process has posed efficiency problems in providing 
education. Finally, there are some blurry areas where it is not clear who is responsible for 
decision making, which makes the resource allocation complicated (Ramirez & Téllez, 
2006). 
The lack of consistency and continuity in the investment on public education and its 
programs hinders the consolidation of a system that could be made available for all. 
Palacios argues that Colombia’s education model “has a dual profile, in which a public 
sector provides primary and secondary education of low quality while at least some of the 
private institutions offer something better. Since education is rightly seen as a privileged 
means of access to the modern sector of the economy, any family with even a remote 




Children who attend public education institutions have no viable alternatives 
compared to children who can afford private education institutions24. Private education is 
not affordable for many, but it is the obvious choice if parents can afford it. Public 
education is therefore attended by children coming from low-income families that have 
little chances of upward social mobility. “Colombian society has not realized the dream of 
providing quality education to the whole population, and the state has failed to fulfill its 
basic duty of unifying the nation via the classroom. Private education is not merely a 
supplement to the public sector, but a necessary alternative” (Palacios, 2006). 
Even though Colombia’s public primary education system has increased enrollment 
rates, number of teachers, and buildings, these “gains were badly distributed 
geographically and accompanied by a decline in quality. The gap between urban and rural 
education continues to be alarming” (Palacios, 2006). Rural education still remains an issue 
that the state has to improve in order to bridge the gap. “In reality that law reveals [a] 
disinterest in rural education, a disinterest based on an ideology intended to justify and 
legitimate a social structure, and especially an agrarian structure, inherited from the 
colonial period. The perpetuation of rural illiteracy is one of the elements that permit the 
conservation of a traditional rural society. It slows horizontal movement (rural to urban), 
and vertical movement (aspirations for land redistribution)”(P. McEwan & Benveniste, 
2001). 
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 Since 1992 there is a coverage expansion program. This program seeks to compensate the unmet demand of 
public education seats by paying low quality private schools a fee for each child it receives. The fee paid per child is 
much lower than the per pupil expenditure in a public school which is an interesting alternative for the state. The 
annual per pupil cost of the coverage expansion program is $600 dollars vs $1,500 in the public sector. 
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Internal displacement is a phenomenon that has unexpectedly closed the rural-
urban gap not because of State efforts to bridge the gap, but because as IDPs end up in the 
cities where they have access to better quality public education. Colombia’s violent conflict 
is causing a positive externality in terms of access to education.  
Colombia’s rural-urban composition has changed in the last century because there 
are more opportunities in the cities coupled with a small presence of the state in rural 
areas. Rural areas are dispersed and the policy impacts are not as significant, thus making 
it more attractive for policy makers to advance programs in densely populated areas.  
The purpose of this section was to show that Colombia’s development of its 
education system has produced a rural-urban gap that prevents upward social mobility in 
part because its traditional society is interested in maintaining it that way. It is also evident 
that maintaining the status quo is not sustainable because civil conflicts have emerged that 
require actions from society in order to prevent humanitarian disasters.  
Internal displacement has been a constant in Colombia for the last 60 years. 
Violence in the rural areas has caused displacement of an important number of people who 
are forced to settle in the cities, feeding the cities’ poverty belts and giving visibility to the 
disparities in our society. The Constitution of 1991 played an important role in establishing 
the responsibilities of the state with regards to its citizens. How can a country with visible 
rural-urban disparities pretend its displaced population to return to their places of origin if 
they know that they have access to better quality of life in the cities? What policies have to 
be put in place in order to promote their return to the rural areas? Colombia’s policy for 
victim’s restitution has focused on giving back families their lost assets but it has not been 
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very effective for several reasons, families do not trust that once they return their safety is 
granted, their economic conditions will be affected and access to public services such as 
health and education will be very limited unlike in the cities.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review 
 
 
Because it represents an involuntary geographical relocation, internal displacement 
and refugee movements can be categorized as an involuntary migratory movement. 
Colombia’s violent conflict, for instance, has dispersed a large segment of the population 
throughout the country, leading to massive internal migration flows.  
The chapter begins with a review of the literature on the effects of different types of 
migration on enrollment, for example economic migration and migration as a result of 
violent conflict, in order to identify the differences, if there exist, between different types of 
migration. In addition, the chapter will review a selected literature on a set of factors that 
also influence enrollment and that are of relevance for the case of displaced families in 
Colombia. For instance, the chapter examines the literature on orphanhood because some 
children coming from ID households loose a parent or both parents. It also discusses 
studies examining how conditional cash transfer programs affect school enrollment. This is 
of relevance because internally displaced persons that fulfill certain requirements in 
Colombia are eligible for government aid through the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program. 
This program’s objective is to alleviate the vulnerability conditions of displaced families 
once they arrive at the destination municipalities and attempts to create some incentives, 
for example for families to enroll their children at school.  
Migration 
 
Reed, et al. (2010) analyze economic migration patterns in Ghana including not only 
rural-urban and urban-urban migration, but rural-rural and urban-rural migration, that 
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although less common, also deserve attention. Additionally, step migration, or the sequence 
of moves from smaller communities to larger communities as opposed to a single move 
from a rural community to a large urban area, “may provide a more nuanced picture of 
internal mobility than a simple rural-urban model” (Reed et al., 2010). Step migration 
suggests that towns and secondary cities will serve as intermediate destinations for urban-
ward migrants, and highlights urban-urban movement in developing countries. As in the 
case of economic migration in Ghana, IDPs in Colombia have a similar pattern. IDPs have a 
step migration process from their municipalities of origin to their destination 
municipalities; this occurs mainly because intermediate municipalities do not have an 
appropriate infrastructure to receive incoming population, there are no labor opportunities 
in smaller municipalities or, in the case of IDPs, they feel they are not invisible enough and 
can be easily targeted.  
The authors use a dichotomous logistic nested model of inter-regional migration to 
predict the log odds of moving across regions in a given year; “higher educational 
attainment is significantly associated with higher log odds of migrating, but being in school 
or employed in the previous year are both significantly associated with lower log odds of 
moving (-0.390, p<0.001, and -0.642, p<0.001)” (Reed et al., 2010). The results show that, 
as in Colombia, educational attainment plays an important role in the migration decision 
both for economic reasons as for what Ibañez (2008) classifies as preventive migration. 
Her results show that families with higher educational attainment are able to anticipate 
violent actions and displace earlier than those with lower educational attainment. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that families with lower educational attainment depend more on 
the job they hold at the municipality of origin because their endowments are lower and 
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they move when violent conflict conditions risk their lives. Contrary to Reed et al. (2010) 
findings, even if children are enrolled in school or adults have a job, families are forced to 
displace if they are victims violence acts leaving all behind. 
Liang & Chen (2007) use data from the 1995 China 1% Population Sample Survey to 
estimate school enrollment rates for temporary migrant children, permanent migrant 
children, and local children. The authors argue that as more people migrate and expand the 
duration of the migration period in the cities, the chances that their children will be part of 
the migrant population are higher. As a result the cities are going to have larger numbers of 
migrant children without local hukou,25 which creates major problems for their parents and 
challenges for education policy-makers. Given this background the authors examine the 
school enrollment of migrant children between the ages of six and fifteen, an age group for 
whom 9-year compulsory education is required in China according to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) Law of Compulsory Education, who resided in cities of Guangdong province 
in 1995. As in China, compulsory education in Colombia goes from five to fifteen years of 
age.  
Given that education is an engine of social mobility in China, the authors consider 
that “it is essential for migrant children to be enrolled in and to complete elementary and 
secondary schools, as this is a necessary step for socioeconomic advancement in urban 
society”(Liang & Chen, 2007). 
                                                     
 
25
 Hukou system is “an institution with the power to restrict population mobility and access to state-sponsored 
benefits for the majority of China’s rural population” (Wing Chan & Buckingham, 2008). 
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Two major findings emerge from multivariate analyses of school enrollment by 
Liang and Chen (2007). First, “temporary migrant children are much less likely to be 
enrolled in school compared to local children. Temporary migrants with less than one year 
of residence in cities suffer the most.” Although to the authors’ surprise, “permanent 
migrant children are more likely to be enrolled in school than local children due largely to 
the highly selective nature of their parents.” Second, “compared to non-migrant children at 
the place of origin, rural temporary migrant children from Guangdong also encounter a 
major disadvantage in terms of school enrollment.” Even though migrant parents have 
probably made income gains by working in the cities of Guangdong, their children suffered 
in terms of education thus the disadvantages faced by temporary migrant children “are 
likely to have detrimental and long-term consequences for migrant children and for urban 
society as a whole.” 
It is the temporary migrant children within the first year of arrival that suffer the 
most in school enrollment having a school enrollment rate of 60%. Temporary migrants 
who have lived in cities for more than five years actually are able to reach parity in school 
enrollment with local children. While this finding certainly gives the authors some sense of 
comfort, they note that school enrollment is only one of the measures of school outcomes. 
Internal displacement and economic migration follow a similar pattern during the first 
year. The results in this dissertation show that after the first year enrollment increases 
although it does not reach parity with local children. 
The integration of ID households to a new environment can be detrimental for 
school enrollment of their children. As Liang and Chen (2007) show that enrollment is low 
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during the first year for children belonging to temporary migrant households, children of 
ID families have lower chances of enrollment during the first year and mainly during the 
first six months given that the Familias en Accion for IDPs is aimed at stabilizing the 
household but not at school enrollment. However, once families are stabilized, school 
enrollment increases. There is a difference between families who declare displacement 
compared to those who do not because in the latter families do not receive government aid 
for stabilization and their integration to a new environment can be slower. Nevertheless, 
after 60 months, as shown in the results, school enrollment for ID children is similar. 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programs 
 
 
As mentioned in the background chapter, IDPs that meet the criteria established in 
Law 387 of 1997are eligible to receive government aid. IDPs are registered on the RUPD 
database after their declaration of displacement is validated. IDPs receive emergency 
humanitarian aid for six months period during which they can transfer to the Conditional 
Cash Transfer (CCT) designed for this group called Familias en Accion for IDPs, one of the 
Accion Social Agency programs.  If ID families live in one of the 702 treatment 
municipalities the Familias en Accion for IDPs program gives families funds for nutrition, 
education and health. The Accion Social Agency programs are based on Mexico’s Progresa 
and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola, both described below including program evaluation results 
related to education.  
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An emblematic CCT program is Progresa26 in Mexico. The effect of this program on 
enrollment has been studied by Schultz (2004) and de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) who 
have showed that a small monetary incentive is enough to induce beneficiary households to 
invest in their children’s human capital (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006).  Progresa’s design 
was initiated by identifying from administrative and census data the poorest and less likely 
to succeed rural communities in Mexico. This was followed by a second census of 495 
identified rural communities in order to construct a household latent poverty index. Two 
thirds of the communities were then randomly selected as the treatment group and the 
remaining communities as control group. The federal government announced in 1998 that 
educational grants were available for eligible mothers of children enrolled in school and 
whose attendance could be confirmed to be more than 85% of the school days. The amount 
of the educational grants increased with each grade and there was a premium for girls27. A 
mother would receive $70 Mexican Pesos (USD $7) per child enrolled in third grade up to 
$225 Mexican Pesos (USD $22) per child in ninth grade every month.  
Schultz (2004) uses the household empirical framework in order to consider the 
determinants of school enrollment and a probit model to describe the enrollment decision 
process. Additionally, the author estimates the program effect with a difference-in-
differences empirical model. The author finds that enrollment rates in Progresa localities 
are higher than in non-beneficiary localities. The difference between these two groups is 
                                                     
 
26
 The program is now called Oportunidades but it is still referred to by its former name.  
27
 Mothers received from $10 Mexican pesos in sixth grade to $30 Mexican pesos in ninth grade. 
43 
 
statistically significant and different from zero within each distinguished group of children 
who completed grades one to sixth in the previous year.  
de Janvry and Sadoulet’s (2006) paper examines the efficiency of Progresa’s 
education transfers because they argue that given that the gross enrollment rate of 
children living in low-income communities was 96% before the program its one percentage 
point increase in enrollment is very costly and inefficient. The authors suggest that the 
program should be aimed at maintaining the enrollment rate in the transition from primary 
to secondary school which is a moment where enrollment decreases. Additionally, the 
authors design a model of optimal cash transfer which is aimed at identifying children who 
most probably will not enroll in secondary school because they join the labor market. They 
find that by targeting and calibrating the program there is an efficiency gain of 44% but its 
implementation could be very expensive. 
Glewwe and Kassouf (2008) examine the impact of Brazil’s Bolsa Escola (later 
renamed Bolsa Familia) on children’s progress in school. The Bolsa Escola is a CCT program 
that provides monthly cash transfers to low-income households if their children (between 
six and fifteen years of age) are enrolled in school and attend at least for 85% of the school 
year. This program started in 1998 in two municipalities and by 2007 over 11 million 
families (around 46 million people or 25% of Brazil’s population) were beneficiaries of the 
Bolsa Escola program. The cost of the program represents 0.4% of the country’s GDP. This 
program is aimed at families with a monthly household income below 120 Reais (USD $60) 
which is about half the minimum wage. Families receive 15 Reais (USD $7.5) monthly per 
child and up to three children per household are covered.  
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The authors use Brazil’s school census data which is administered to over 250,000 
schools yearly. The census data has information on students’ enrollment, dropout rate, 
repetition and grade promotion but no information on student’s academic performance. 
The authors construct a panel with the school census data and identify if the schools have 
students who are beneficiaries of the Bolsa Escola program and they estimate the 
program’s effect on enrollment with the difference between the average treatment effect 
(ATE) over all students aged six to fifteen and the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). Results show that the program increased enrollment by 5.5% in first to fourth 
grades and by 6.5% in fifth to eight grades. Furthermore, the dropout rate was reduced 0.5 
percentage points and the grade promotion rate increased by 0.9%.  
Both Progresa and Bolsa Escola programs have shown positive results in increasing 
school enrollment and assistance to school. These two programs are aimed at low-income 
families as identified by a latent poverty index in Mexico and the head of household income 
in Brazil. The Acción Social Agency in Colombia has designed several CCT programs aimed 
at different population groups such as Familias en Accion for IDPs, Familias en Accion for 
indigenous or afrocolombian population and Familias en Accion for low-income families 
which among its benefits include a monetary stipend for each child enrolled in school who 
attends at least 85% of the school year. In this dissertation I will discuss what is the effect 
associated with the participation in the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program on enrollment 
compared to IDPs who are not enrolled in the program using a difference-in-differences 
empirical strategy. The positive results of both Progresa and Bolsa Escola indicate that the 
Colombian program will also have a positive effect on enrollment. 
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Research on the determinants of School Enrollment 
 
Several authors have discussed gender disparities in enrollment; Filmer and Schady 
(2008) evaluate the impact of a program that gives scholarships to girls in the transition 
from primary to secondary school in Cambodia. According to the 2000 Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) while 85% of fifteen to nineteen year olds had completed the first 
year of primary school, 27% had completed seventh grade, the numbers are lower for rural 
areas and even lower for girls in rural areas (78% and 17% respectively). The Cambodian 
government initiated a series of measures in order to increase enrollment. The authors 
evaluate the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) scholarship program that consisted 
of a USD $45 award for a sample of girls who were on seventh grade and it could be 
extended for the three years of secondary school. The CCT is given to the families, provided 
that their daughters are enrolled in school, maintain a passing grade and are not absent for 
more than ten days in each school year.  
The authors evaluate the impact of the program using OLS, propensity score 
matching and regression discontinuity models and they found that the JFPR scholarship 
program has a large and positive effect on school enrollment. The OLS and regression 
discontinuity results show that enrollment increased by 30% while the propensity score 
matching showed an increase in enrollment of 41%. Furthermore, authors found that the 
effect is larger for girls that come from lower income households, have parents with less 
education, and lived further away from their schools.  
As in Cambodia, children’s enrollment in Colombia declines in their transition from 
primary school to middle school and the effect of a targeted CCT program such as the JFPR 
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scholarships gives evidence of the benefits of increasing enrollment and attendance to 
school.  
Post-conflict Afghanistan has brought four million children back to school 
(Guimbert, Miwa, & Thanh Nguyen, 2008). The authors assess the impact of several factors 
on enrollment given the importance of raising the literacy rate in a country where almost 
80% of the population is illiterate. Guimbert, et al. discuss the fact that there can be supply 
side constraints such as distance, inadequate school facilities, and teachers’ gender that 
affect enrollment; as well as demand side constraints, such as the opportunity cost of 
attending schools (many girls are involved in domestic work), the need for increasing 
household income, and the high costs of education.  
The authors use three datasets, the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, School 
Census, and National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment and estimate the models using 
probit, logit and linear probability model specifications. They recognize that given the 
characteristics of the data, any study must deal with omitted variable bias, measurement 
error, selection bias and endogeneity. The results show that the perception of lower 
security risks, the distance to schools, and perceived quality of schools all increase the 
probability of enrollment. On the other hand, gender is one of the most influential factors 
for enrollment (against girls). In addition, children of larger families have lower 
probabilities of being enrolled in school. Having illiterate parents or parents that do not 
have a regular salary is also linked to lower enrollment. 
Although gender disparities in Colombia are not as profound as in Cambodia or 
Afghanistan, the determinants of enrollment as studied by Guimbert, et al. are similar as 
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the determinants of enrollment for IDPs in Colombia. Both countries have undergone an 
internal violent conflict that has affected its population, especially children. As in 
Afghanistan, security is a major deterrent of school attendance in rural areas. After 
displacement, once IDPs are located in larger municipalities, the perception of security 
improves and so does enrollment. Moreover, as discussed in the background chapter, the 
distance to school in rural areas and the perception of schools’ quality has a negative effect 
on enrollment which changes in larger municipalities.  
Case, Paxson and Ableidinger (2004) examine the impact of orphanhood on 
children’s school enrollment in ten sub-Saharan African countries. According to UNAIDS, 
the countries affected by HIV/AIDS have pronounced concentrations of orphans28. 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) show that 15% of children with less than fifteen 
years of age have lost one or both parents in Sub-Saharan African countries. The motivation 
of the authors is to examine the impact of orphanhood on school enrollment of children 
using data from nineteen DHS studies conducted in ten Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Children are classified in four categories for the analysis, non-orphans, paternal orphans, 
maternal orphans, and double orphans in order to identify the impact of the death of one 
parent.  
In order to analyze the effect of orphanhood on school enrollment, the authors 
discuss that the death of a parent can affect in three ways the determinants of schooling: by 
affecting the child’s economic circumstances, their school readiness, and their relationship 
                                                     
 
28
 The countries included in the article are: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Seven of the ten countries belong to the AIDS belt that goes from Eastern to 
Southern Africa; these countries have orphan rates in excess of 9%. 
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to the adult decision makers. The authors use a linear probability model specification. The 
results show that orphans are significantly disadvantaged in school enrollment mainly 
because of their living arrangements and not as other studies have found that it is because 
of lower wealth or because their gender. “Across 10 sub-Saharan African countries, [they 
find] that the degree of relatedness between orphans and their adult caregivers is highly 
predictive of children’s outcomes” (Case et al., 2004). Their policy recommendation follows 
the intra-household bargaining models outcomes because there is discrimination within 
the household, thus if the household is beneficiary of aid it will most likely not have an 
impact on the child’s enrollment.  
Orphanhood affects ID children in Colombia due to its internal violent conflict. As 
discussed by Case, et al., children’s enrollment is affected by a parent’s loss because of the 
decrease in family income, wealth decrease, their school readiness, their relationship to the 
adult decision makers and their early integration to the labor market. ID children in 
Colombia can face not only the loss of one of their parents but also a physical separation 
from one of them given that it is the case that families decide to separate with one of its 
members staying to guard their assets and others moving to other municipalities where 
security conditions are better. Families’ fragmentation can also affect their well-being and 
have adverse effects on enrollment.  
Other studies examining the determinants of enrollment also consider the 
environment in which the households are immersed as an essential factor. Dostie and 
Jayaraman (2006) examine the issue for Indian Villages. The authors explore the 
determinants of school enrollment in the villages of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, two North 
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Indian States that account for 40% of India’s population, with enrollment rates around 
35% for children between six and eleven years of age, with particular focus on aggregate 
effects at the village level.  
They discuss that villages have three channels through which they influence school 
participation, the price effect, raising the expected returns to schooling, and the effect of 
collective action. However, they are confronted with three issues, first, they cannot 
distinguish which of the three channels is at work, second, there is a serious endogeneity 
problem present in empirical testing of group effects and third, there is an additional 
endogeneity bias that could be generated if schools are allocated non-randomly and the 
criteria for allocation are correlated with unobserved factors that affect enrollment. 
The authors use the Survey of Living Conditions and the Living Standards 
Measurement Survey datasets, adopting a latent model specification to find the probability 
of enrollment. The results show that individual and household characteristics are very 
important. Furthermore, mother’s education plays a significant role, particularly for girls. 
The household’s wealth is also a strong determinant of enrollment. Finally, the authors 
show that village contextual effects, such as village road access, which can be a proxy for 




This literature review shows that households play an important role on the 
children’s enrollment decision. From the migration perspective, results show that the 
presence of household members is important for children’s schooling and in the case of 
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household fragmentation, the economic assistance provided by absent household members 
also increases enrollment.  Insofar as internally displaced children may also suffer from 
fragmented households or missing family members, the results of this literature have 
serious implications as well for any study examining the determinants of enrollment 
among this population. 
From the CCT programs perspective, results show that the programs are meeting 
the objective of increasing enrollment through an economic incentive provided to the 
household.  The discussion focuses on the optimal amount of the incentive and not on 
whether the economic incentive should exist or not.  This literature is, again, highly 
relevant to the discussion of internally displaced families, some of which have had access to 
government-subsidies programs, but even more importantly in terms of the potential 
policy implications of promoting CCT programs among the internally displaced.
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This chapter will introduce a theoretical framework to study the decision-making 
process of internally displaced families with respect to the enrollment of their children 
(between five and seventeen years of age) in school.  The purpose of the economic theory is 
to examine how the forces affecting families –including displacement—may affect their 
behavior about schooling and, consequently, the enrollment of their children. Thus, the 
decision making process plays a central role.  
The study of how individuals or families change their behavior in maximizing their 
utility in reaction to exogenous changes or incentives is key to how economists describe 
the possible consequences of those disturbances or policies. Internally displaced families in 
Colombia are forced, by external conditions, to rebuild their lives while facing difficult 
conditions. Among their survival mode decisions are housing, nutrition, labor, health and 
schooling intuitively in that order. Of particular importance is the schooling decision 
because of the implications it has for the future of these families in terms of, for example, 
social mobility, higher income, and better access to information, among others.  
The chapter discusses the unitary household model, which is the basis for much of 
the economic analysis of school enrollment decisions. There is also an analysis of a more 
complex approach based on intra-household bargaining models, with a discussion of the 
relative advantages and criticisms of these models.  
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Unitary household model 
 
 
The unitary household model, introduced by Gary Becker (1981), establishes that 
household members are altruistic or selfish and this behavior “helps families insure 
members against disasters and other consequences of uncertainty (…) In particular an 
altruist internalizes all “external” effects of his actions on different beneficiaries as he 
maximizes the sum of his own income or consumption and the incomes or consumptions of his 
beneficiaries. Moreover, each beneficiary, no matter how selfish, is induced by the reactions of 
the altruist to internalize the effects of his actions on the altruist’s own income and 
consumption” (Becker, 1981). Thus under the assumption of altruism, the altruist’s utility 
function is equivalent to the household’s utility function which is maximized subject to the 
household’s income. 
In an altruistic household, individual welfare, including investment in children’s 
education and health, is decided by two factors: how far out the family budget constraint 
can be pushed, and how much the altruist values each beneficiary’s welfare (Haddad, 
Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997). “With the unitary approach, who earns the income should 
not matter to household consumption patterns. In other words, income is pooled” (Xu, 
2005). This model presents households as a single unit that maximizes utility where 
decisions are made by either an altruistic or a dictatorial member. Furthermore, “unitary 
household models assume that family members’ utility functions can be systematically 
aggregated, that individual budget constraints can be combined, and that household 
production can be unified” (Xu, 2005). The idea behind this model is that all household 
members’ preferences can be aggregated, because they are homogeneous or there is an 
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altruistic or selfish member has the power to make decisions. Furthermore, if all household 
members contribute their income to a common fund they will care about their joint income 
and all of them try to maximize it, even the beneficiaries.  
Becker (1981, 1991) presented the Rotten Kid Theorem which states that “each 
beneficiary, no matter how selfish, would maximize the family income of his benefactor, 
and thereby would internalize all effects of his actions on other beneficiaries” (Becker, 
1981). Bergstrom (1989) argues that if the Rotten Kid Theorem is one of the most 
important results in the theories of incentives because it establishes that there are no free 
riders or principal-agent problems within a household. Still, Bergstrom demonstrates that 
the Rotten Kid Theorem applies less generally than what is believed. “The theorem remains 
true for a restrictive, but still interesting, class of preferences and technologies” 
(Bergstrom, 1989). 
The following economic framework shows how households decide about the 
schooling of children is adopted from Bobonis’s model on how households allocate 
resources together (Bobonis, 2005). 
A household composed by a couple will maximize an aggregate welfare function 
    (       )   (       )   where   (       ) is the female utility and   (       ) is 
the male utility over the consumption vector c and household public goods vector q; 
children-related expenditures are part of the public goods vector. The vectors µ and ε 
represent, respectively, observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, which 





     
   ∑     (     )          where pc and pq are private and public consumption 
goods price vectors, pli and cli are wages and leisure of individual i (i=M, F); yi is the non-
labor income of individual i; y0 is the aggregated income of the household, and T is the total 
time endowment of each individual i. 
This model of household behavior formalized by Becker assumes that either families 
maximize a single utility function, i.e., that either all household members have identical 
preferences (utility functions are identical) or that one household member functions as a 
dictator so the aggregate welfare function is equivalent to the dictator’s utility function, 
determining all allocations within the household (Becker, 1991). The dictator 
interpretation assumes that even if preferences are heterogeneous the household resource 
allocation decision will not be affected. Consequently, the demand for the household’s 
public or private goods will only depend on prices, household’s non-labor income, 
  ∑       , and observed and unobserved household characteristics. Finally, changes in 
the couple’s share of non-labor income do not affect the demand functions since it does not 
imply changes in the household’s non-labor income and thus the budget constraint. The 
demand functions are, then: 
   (       ) and    (       ). 
Limitations of the Unitary Household Model 
 
 
Based on a review of the literature on the unitary household model, there are two 
reiterative observations on the limitations of this model; the first is related to the income 
pooling assumption and the second on the implication that policies target specific 
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household members and not the household. Furthermore, while the unitary model has 
provided insights into household behavior, it offers little perspective on how individual 
preferences inform these allocations (P. H. Brown, 2009). 
The unitary model allows for a variation in prices (wages) within the household but 
resources are pooled and distributed according to a shared utility among members. 
Alderman, et al., mention that “this assumption requires that at least one member of the 
household is able to monitor the other members and to sanction those who fall foul of its 
rules, an issue both of information flows and control” (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, 
Hoddinott, & Kanbur, 1995). The authors discuss that the unitary model “fails to 
incorporate the process by which resources are distributed within households” (Alderman 
et al., 1995). Within a household there can exist distributional inequalities that are efficient 
for the household, for example, the recognition of differences in ability to earn higher 
incomes that later will be shared by household members cannot be identified. 
Furthermore, resources could be distributed favoring age or gender which unveils 
discrimination within the household and the assumption of a single utility function does 
not hold. Moreover, as discussed by Xu, within the unitary approach, any unequal allocation 
of resources can be justified on efficiency grounds, which is unappealing to the studies on 
discrimination and gender bias. “Leaving resource allocation behavior to the black box of 
the family can lead to failure in targeting the population group of concern in policy and 
program design” (Xu, 2007). Finally, given that household decisions on resource allocation 
may find it optimal to concentrate a disproportional amount of resources on certain 
members, the unitary household model “fails to capture the importance of distributional 
conflict within the family” (Tharmmapornphilas, 2009). 
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Unitary household models have been used in analyzing the policy effects of transfers 
(e.g., Conditional Cash Transfers) to the household. The altruist or benevolent dictator head 
of household will incorporate the transfer made to the household and it will assign it 
among household members equally because of identical preferences. Alderman, et al. 
discuss that the “unitary model implies that what matters for certain policy initiatives-such 
as public works schemes or transfer programs-is the amount of income the household 
receives, not the identity of the individual within the household who is the target of the public 
program. Conversely, under some alternative models, the efficacy of programs depends on the 
member of the household targeted” (Alderman et al., 1995). Moreover, Ponczek 
(2011)argues that policy makers recognized the importance of the decision process inside 
the household in order to make better and more efficient transfer policies. “Using the 
unitary model of the household as a guideline for policy prescriptions may be misleading, 
since the effect of public transfers may differ depending on the identity of the income 
recipient. Therefore, targeting transfers to the household may not result in the desired 
consequences, given that transfers directed to the head of the family, to the spouse or to 
elderly people may have different impacts over the family” (Ponczek, 2011). 
Furthermore, bargaining positions of resource allocation can vary depending on 
who brings the income to the household thus shifting the bargaining power of its members. 
Bobonis (2009) shows a substantial body of research indicating that familial allocation 
decisions are affected by the resources that individual decision makers bring to the table. 
Additionally, in order to further the welfare of children, policies can channel resources 
towards certain types of individuals within households, “thereby exogenously altering the 
intra-household distribution of income, is an instrument widely used by governments, 
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typically to further the welfare of children” (Browning, Chiappori, & Lechene, 2009). 
Finally, the unitary household model fails to identify the effect of targeted programs on 
individuals within a household which can lead to a failure to understand the impact of 
public policies.  
Intra-household bargaining models 
 
 
Intra-household bargaining models have been developed in response to the unitary 
household model’s restrictive assumptions. According to Chiappori and Donni, “these 
models share a basic theoretical trait: each individual in the household has their own 
individual preferences” (Chiappori & Donni, 2009). Intra household bargaining models are 
divided in two categories, non-cooperative (strategic) models that use the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium concept and cooperative (or collective) models are based on the hypothesis 
that the decision process within the household, whatever that may turn out to be, produces 
Pareto-efficient outcomes (Chiappori & Donni, 2009).  
Consider a household composed of two individuals, F and M that have individual 
preferences over a set of K consumption goods which serve three purposes, F’s private 
consumption, M’s private consumption and a vector of Hicksian composite goods that 
represents public consumption29, represented by the following vectors. 
                                                     
 
29
 “Hicks’s aggregation theorem states that if the prices of a group of commodities vary in strict proportion over 
time, then that group of commodities can be aggregated into a single composite commodity without any aggregation 
error occurring on the markets which are not aggregated. Furthermore, if the prices of a group of commodities vary 
in proportion except for small deviations, then aggregation errors will be small” (Diewert, 1974). 
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The goods purchased by the household are represented by the following vector: 
(         )                      
In a case with no externalities, private goods are purchased by each of the household 
members for its own consumption (for example clothing), public goods are purchased for 
the household’s consumption (such as groceries and children’s education) and goods 
purchased only by one of the household members  are defined as exclusive (for example 
cigarettes). 
The household’s budget constraint is linear and can be represented by: 
      , where y is total house spending and   (       )    is the price vector 




The collective model approach recognizes the bargaining process at the household’s 
interior and relies on the Pareto efficiency principle which means that no household 
member can be worse off in the event of a bargaining outcome. Furthermore, the 
household decision process in collective models leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes, 
although the equilibrium outcome on the efficiency frontier is not necessarily specified. 
Additionally, the decision process can be affected by “distribution factors” (Chiappori & 
Donni, 2009) that are the weights attached to each of the household members’ preferences 
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which capture the household decision making process. These can impact either the budget 
constraint or the household preferences.  
Distribution factors [  (       ) ] are included in the Pareto-efficient solution of a 
utility maximization function with the appropriate weights. There exists a function 
 (         )       , such that the household choice is expressed as below: 
           (         )    (           )  (   (         ))    (           ) subject 
to         
The function  (         ) can be interpreted as the index of distribution of power 
within the household, which is assumed to be continuous and homogeneous of degree zero 
in y and π. If, for example,    , the household preferences are imposed dictatorially by M, 
leaving F without decision power. Conversely if    , F’s preferences are imposed in the 
household.  
Chiappori provides an alternative interpretation of the distribution factors called 
the “sharing rule interpretation” (Xu, 2007). Under the Pareto efficiency assumption, the 
intra-household decision making process can be understood as a two stage process, in the 
first stage decisions are made on how the household’s income is to be divided among 
savings, private consumption and public consumption, in the second stage individuals 
maximize their utility according to the amount of expenditure allocated to them during the 
first stage. Therefore, both the sharing rule interpretation and the distribution factor 
functions allow for the maximization of the household members’ utility. “In the special case 
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in which individuals have the same preferences, we are back in the conventional unitary 
framework, where households have common utility” (Bobonis, 2009). 
The solution to the maximization problem implies that households will have 
demand functions for private and public goods as a function of prices, income and 
household member characteristics (observable and unobservable). The inclusion of the 
distribution functions in the collective model affects the demand functions for both private 
and public goods in the household given that each household member will be able to 
maximize his or her utility. “Under the collective framework, changes in partners income 
shares will lead to shifts in the sharing rule, and these will lead to changes in the allocation 
decision” (Bobonis, 2005). 
Demand functions under the collective model can be defined as follows: 
   (     (         )    ) 
   (     (         )    ) 
Limitations of the collective model 
 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that there is endogeneity in the distribution factors 
because they are affected by the household members’ income and are not exogenous as the 
model establishes it. Basu (2006) argues that what determines the relative bargaining 
power within a household is not the relative male/female market wage rate but what 
he/she actually earn. Moreover, what he/she earns depends on the amount of hours 
worked which is a deliberate choice and is not exogenously determined. In order to 
address the endogeneity issue, Basu (2006) proposed the endogenous power collective 
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household model which uses the inverse influence of the effects of household decisions on 
the balance of power. The author argues that the balance of power follows a dynamic 
adjustment process which means that a shift in the balance of power does not happen 
instantly but rather through a period of time. Therefore, “within each period a “sub-game 
equilibrium” is reached and the household’s “consumption path” is generated across 
periods. Over time a “household equilibrium” is reached by employing a natural 
equilibrium idea (…) The existence of a sub-game equilibrium does not guarantee 
consumption levels lying on the household equilibrium utility frontier” (Xu, 2007).  
Given that one of the objectives of the collective model is to increase efficiency, even 
if the outcomes of each game are efficient (sub-game equilibrium); the outcomes in the long 
run are not necessarily efficient. If these sub-game equilibria are not Pareto efficient in the 
long run, then it is not possible to increase the welfare of a household member without 
reducing the welfare of another member. 
Non-cooperative models  
 
 
Non-cooperative models (Alderman et al., 1995; Kanbur, 1991; Ulph, 1988) “rely on 
the assumption that individuals cannot enter into binding and enforceable contracts with 
each other” (Alderman et al., 1995). Household members are assumed to maximize their 
utility functions with respect to their budget constraint and the other household members’ 
decisions. Non-cooperative models are referred to as Nash-Cournot models because they 
represent the outcomes of the household decisions using game theory tools.  
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Given that Pareto efficiency is not easily attainable within a household, these models 
introduce the threat points or fallback positions for each household member. Threat points 
are defined as a reservation utility that “represents the minimum welfare level a household 
member could obtain in any case (and especially if no collective agreement could be 
reached)” (Chiappori, 1992). Threat points are a function of extra-environmental 
parameters such as macroeconomic, demographic or legal conditions external to the 
household. According to McElroy (1990) some of these conditions include sex ratios in 
marriage markets, laws concerning alimony and child support, changes in tax status 
associated with different marital states, and, in developing countries, the ability of women 
to return to their homes. Other conditions include divorce rates, cultural norms and 
institutional practices. 
Xu’s literature review presents three studies that have made important 
contributions to the non-cooperative intra-household bargaining framework. “Harsanyi 
and Selten (1972) generalize the Nash solution to a cooperative game by relaxing the 
symmetry assumption, while Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1986) integrate a non-cooperative threat point with a repeated game with an alternate 
offering from two agents” (Xu, 2007). Threat points are essential for the definition of the 
non-cooperative bargaining models and are also problematic because they “include an 
unrealistic threat point external to the marriage and the fact that agreements resulting 
from bargaining are not self-enforcing at the same time when such agreements are little 
likely to be binding without cost” (Xu, 2007). Divorce rate is an example of an unrealistic 
threat point because not all intra-household conflicts get as far as to consider divorce an 
option. “Despite these technical difficulties, however, the Nash bargaining approach may 
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(once adequately designed) provide useful insights into the consequences of taking into 
account intra-household decision making processes” (Chiappori, 1992). 
Closing the loop: Economic Theory and the Displaced 
 
 
As has been discussed in this chapter, the unitary household model has been 
referred to as a black box because either all individuals are considered to have the same 
utility function or because there is a dictator that makes all household decisions. The 
unitary household assumption has been questioned given the recognition of the household 
as a place of collaboration and conflict. Household members bargain because they do not 
necessarily seek the same objective. Two stems of research have made important 
contributions to intra-household bargaining models, collective and non-cooperative 
models. “Despite the accumulated evidence that income is not pooled, the unitary model, 
bolstered by ad hoc assumptions, retains an impressive ability to explain the new body of 
evidence on inequality within the household. Moreover, in many cases the choice of models 
will not affect either policy or research; Occam's razor argues that in these cases the simplest 
approach be taken” (Alderman et al., 1995). 
Household economics authors have questioned this assumption and intra-household 
bargaining models have been proposed that are more accurate in identifying the roles 
played by household members with regards to their decisions. Although these 
contributions are valuable, their empirical analysis depends on the datasets richness, 
meaning that certain information is required in order to study the results of the bargaining 
process among household members.  
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This is the case of the National Survey of Displaced Households - ENHD database 
that was designed and applied to displaced households. The ENHD by construction 
aggregates information at the household level making it imperative to use the unitary 
household bargaining model in the empirical strategy.  
After displacement, families face situations that leave them in a vulnerable state 
given the scarcity of available resources. An important percentage of IDPs fall under the 
poverty line, thus their efforts are targeted at pooling their income and maximizing their 
scarce resources which fits well under the altruism model stated by Becker (1981). 
Exogenous incentives, such as government aid from the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program, are contingent on the families’ admission to the program. The aid provided to 
these families can modify their decisions because funds are earmarked for specific 
expenses such as nutrition, housing and education. The Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program assists families in the registration of their children in public schools in order to 
provide incentives for attendance to school by the household’s children and it provides 
materials needed by the children such as school uniforms and textbooks. Because these 
households’ income level places them around the poverty line, their response to the 
Familias en Accion for IDPs Program incentives is essential to analyze empirically. The 
following chapters move to examine the data sets utilized in this dissertation, the 
econometric methods, and the conclusions of this analysis.
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Chapter 5: Data 
 
 
The National Survey of Displaced Households (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
Desplazados – ENHD) objective is to characterize the displacement process, identify welfare 
losses from displacement, and evaluate income-generation programs. The sample was 
designed using three subsamples, the first third comes from the Catholic Church database, 
the second third is composed of people who live nearby the first subsample’s places of 
residence but were not in the Church’s database and the third are beneficiaries of foreign 
aid30. The Catholic Church has been collecting individual information on IDPs since 1995 
which makes it the first information system of the displaced population in Colombia 
(Ibáñez & Moya, 2010). The Catholic Church’s database was selected by the research team 
because this institution does not evaluate the validity of displacement; it registers people 
who seek assistance in the parishes after displacement.  
There are several institutions that collect information on IDPs in Colombia. The 
government’s database includes people who have declared before an Attorney’s Office their 
situation in order to apply for government aid, CODHES’ database which is an ONG that 
obtains its figures based on news and what IDP’s report, and the Catholic Church surveys 
internally displaced families.  
Each database has detractors; for example, the government’s database gathers 
information since 1997 on people who declare their status at an Attorney’s Office so those 
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 USAID income generation programs 
66 
 
who are not aware of the declaration procedure or are not seeking government aid are out 
of the sample31. Furthermore, people who have received threats at their places of origin 
will probably not trust public institutions or can feel the need to remain invisible in order 
to prevent further threats. Also, people who have been displaced for a long period, for 
example, whose displacement was before 1997, are not considered IDPs so they are not 
included in the database although they are displaced. The Accion Social Agency established 
that in order to prevent people who are not really internally displaced from taking 
advantage of the government aid, the declaration at the public office has to be done within 
a year of displacement in order to minimize the risk of abuse of government aid. It is for 
these reasons that the government sample is underrepresented.  
The CODHES database has gathered information since 1985 based on a statistics by 
consensus methodology from news reports, local authorities and multiple actors. This 
methodology has been criticized because the IDPs can be oversampled, given that the 
information is not obtained at an individual level, there could be duplicates and it may 
include people who are not internally displaced because of violence. Moreover, CODHES 
work has as a goal to give visibility to the situation of the displaced, experienced by 10% of 
Colombia’s population.  
Finally, the Catholic Church database (RUT32) comes from a survey conducted to 
families or groups that seek help at parishes in Colombia and it does not have bias but it 
leaves out the sample people who do not feel comfortable with the Catholic Church because 
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 State Registry for the Displaced Population (RUPD by its Spanish acronym) – Registro Unico para la Poblacion 
Desplazada 
32
 The RUT system receives its name from the Biblical character Ruth, an immigrant who arrived in ancient Israel. 
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of trust or because they are connected through other networks. Also there can be places 
where there are no parishes thus leaving some people out of the sample.  
The ENHD was applied between 2004 and 2005 by the Universidad de los Andes, 
together with the Catholic Church and funding from the World Bank. The purpose of 
collecting the information was to construct a survey that could describe the forced 
displacement process, identify the characteristics of the displaced population, gather 
information about their living standards before and after displacement, evaluate the 
income generation programs, and establish under what conditions are the displaced 
population willing to return to their places of origin (Ibañez, 2008). This database is a 
valuable tool to study the impact of forced displacement on several situations faced by 
IDPs. Additionally it can be exploited to enrich the debate on the State’s role with respect to 
Colombian victims of violence. 
The empirical analysis uses the ENHD cross sectional household data; the sample 
includes 2,322 displaced households located in 48 municipalities within 21 departmentos. 
Figure 3 shows the sample distribution according to the destination municipalities by 
departamento. The concentration of the sample at the departamento level goes from light 
green to dark green where the latter shows a higher concentration of ID families. 
Furthermore, the concentration of the sample at the municipality level goes from yellow 
and a small circle to a deep red and larger circle. According to this sample, the highest 
recipient departamentos are Bolivar, Tolima, Caqueta and Valle and the highest reception 
municipalities are Cali, Ibague and Mocoa. 
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Figure 6-1: Sample distribution map 
 
A third of the sample is consist of people who are enrolled in the RUT database, the 
second third are people not enrolled in the RUT database but are also victims of internal 
displacement, and the last third is composed of families participating in a USAID income 
generation programs.  
There are 4,546 children between 5 and 17 years of age in the sample and the 
individual level empirical analysis will focus on this subsample. According to the 
Constitution, compulsory education in Colombia is from 5 to 15 years of age. The Familias 
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en Accion for IDPs Program increased the cap on compulsory schooling and gratuity of 
education for the displaced population ranging from 5 to 17 years of age. This is more 
appropriate for the displaced because it incorporates schooling interruption, differences in 
the quality of education and it seeks to prepare children for a different environment.  
Table 3 shows the households characteristics, as determined by the sample in this 
study. A high percentage (64%) of displaced families left their places of origin because a 
member of the household was threatened, assassinated - 47%, victim of indiscriminate 
violence - 57%, and because of confrontations between armed groups - 48%. Ibañez 
explains that 87% of the displacements in the sample are in reaction to violence (Ibañez, 
2008) and the remaining 13% are preventive, in other words, 87% of the sample has 
experienced directly a violent event. Those who migrate in reaction to a violent act leave 
their belongings behind and their land. It is possible that these people experience a loss in 
their well-being much higher than those whose displacement is planned (preventive). The 
effects of sudden displacement can deteriorate families’ wealth and leave profound scars in 
their sense of security. Additionally they have less time to search for a place where they can 




Table 3 Household characteristics 
Number of households 2,322
Number of adults 7,342
Number of children 4,546
Subsample composition (children)
RUT 35%
Not registered in RUT 31%
Participates in income generation program 34%
Average Household size 5
Average number of children (household) 3
Average number of adults (household) 3
% Literacy (Head of Household) 78%
Reasons for displacement (household)
(there can be more than one reason for displacement)
threats to household members 64%
violent attacks at place of origin 27%
assassinations 47%




confrontations between armed groups 48%
not cooperating with i l legal groups 37%
indiscriminate violence in the town 57%










% Female headed household (household) 39%
% Head of household is employed after displacement 69%
Head of Household - Mean monthly income (USD) $270
% Head of household employed in rural sector
before displacement 59%
after displacement 14%
% registered in AS program (household) 78%
% voted in elections before displacement (adults) 65%
% voted in elections after displacement (adults) 58%
Community participation before displacement (adults)
attended meetings 15%
participated actively 11%
held leadership position 7%
none 67%
Community participation after displacement (adults)
attended meetings 17%
participated actively 9%





Another consequence of forced displacement is the household composition change 
for example, 39% of the households are female headed which can have two effects on 
families’ welfare, on one hand it can diminish it because income can be reduced if only one 
of the parents is present, additionally if the household income is not enough to meet 
expenses, younger people in the household have to participate in the labor market 
probably dropping out of school. On the positive hand, the insertion of females to the labor 
market is faster because they adapt easier to the new conditions. A female headed 
household also can empower women to make the schooling decisions of the children in the 
household and they can perceive the benefits of schooling for their children. In the ENHD 
91% of the households moved with all family members; however it is important to 
consider that some families have had losses.  
Integration to the labor market after displacement is sluggish which affects the 
household’s ability to recover the lost assets and living conditions before displacement. 
Small and medium sized municipalities cannot integrate newcomers because of the size of 
the labor market which is also an issue in larger cities. IDPs end up joining the informal 
labor market and blending with the low-income population. Head of household 
employment rate before displacement was 87% and after displacement 69%, which 
translates into a deterioration of living conditions. Families have to adjust to a new 
environment, from rural to urban, and they need to acquire the skills for jobs in a different 
setting. Before displacement 59% of the heads of households were employed in the 
agriculture sector and after displacement 14% continue in the same sector. Integration to 
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the labor market therefore is slow and in informal jobs that offer on average lower wages33. 
Colombia’s informal labor market absorbs around 44% of the labor force between 2001 
and 2005 (Mora, 2009) a figure that has increased during the last years because the 
absorption of new workers by the formal sector has not been successful in part because 
new workers do not have the necessary skills. These conditions affect the adaptability of 
families to a new environment and can lead them to a poverty trap where they are not able 
to recover their assets and their integration to urban life is surrounded by poor living 
conditions. 
The income generation program’s main objective “is to recover their production 
path” (Ibañez & Moya, 2006b). IDPs interested in participating in income generation 
programs must prove their condition and be registered in Familias en Accion for IDPs. 
Potential beneficiaries are selected and they have to attend training programs and develop 
a business plan which is then submitted for approval. If the business plan is selected people 
receive up to $500 dollars and support in training programs or help in developing small 
enterprises. Ibañez and Moya (2006b) empirical analysis on whether the households are 
able to smooth consumption needs if they are beneficiaries of income generation programs 
show that “beneficiaries of income generation programs recover earlier their ability to 
produce income than non-beneficiaries, albeit after a year of settlement the difference 
between both two groups is not significant.” This result can be interpreted in two ways, 
first income generation programs are able to help families smooth consumption but if the 
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 The definition of informality in the labor market in this case refers to people who are not contributing to the 
pensions or healthcare system.  
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program does not continue supporting its beneficiaries, its effect diminishes. On the other 
hand, IDPs who are not beneficiaries of income generation programs have a difficult time 
integrating to the labor market but after a year they manage to adjust to the new conditions 
and stabilize their situation. As evidenced in the migration literature, people are able to 
stabilize after a year and adapt to the new living conditions, the hurdle to overcome is in 
the first months after displacement and helping families overcome poverty conditions.   
This dissertation will analyze the effect of internal displacement on the enrollment 
of children between 5 and 17 years of age, which represents 38% of the survey sample 
(Colombia’s population between 5 and 17 is 27%). There are a higher percentage of 
children in displaced families probably because they come from rural areas that when 
compared to urban areas, have a higher birth rate. There are 4,546 boys and girls between 
5 and 17 years old at the time of the survey equally distributed in gender and 21% of them 
belonging to a ethnic minority (4% indigenous and 17% afrocolombian).  








% Enrolled in school before displacement (children) 52%
% Enrolled in school after displacement (children) 73%
% Employed after displacement (children) 21%
Health problems during the last 12 months (children)
Fever/Diarrhea 21%
Respiratory problems 7%
Heart problems/High blood pressure 1%
Injury 9%





Ethnic minorities according to the 2005 census figures are 3.4% of the population is 
indigenous and 10.6% is afrocolombian which shows how the latter are target of 
indiscriminate violence. Afrocolombians are concentrated in areas close to the coasts 
where the armed conflict has escalated; they live in regions where drug trafficking related 
activities take place such as coca plantations, laboratories and drug routes.  
According to the data, internally displaced children enrollment increases at 
destination municipalities as the duration of the displacement increases. This can be 
explained by the fact that as families settle, their children improve their educational 
outcomes. Furthermore, increased enrollment can also be due to higher supply of seats in 
the cities given to policies aimed at helping the displaced population. 
Even though enrollment rates are higher at the destination municipalities at the 
elementary level, 81.5 percent, compared to their places of origin, the 52.9 percent 
secondary level enrollment rates are lower after displacement. This result suggests that 
children between 12 and 17 years of age drop out of school because they have to join the 
labor market in order to improve the household’s income level. 
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Figure 6-2 School enrollment by age before and after displacement 
 
Looking at schooling attainment, the data shows that the displaced population is 
behind when compared to the average attainment of their age group. Close to 27 percent of 
displaced children between 7 and 11 years old are below their expected schooling level. 
This indicator increases even more when looking at the 12 to 17 years old group – 38.1 
percent. This result again reveals how children in the latter age group have to drop out 
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Figure 6-3 Overage by age 
 
A number of government policies affect the school enrollment of displaced families 
whether directly or indirectly. The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program attempts to 
stabilize families in their transition to a new environment by granting aid in cash, 
participating in income generation programs, access to health, housing subsidies if they 
decide to buy34. Furthermore, if families are able to prove land ownership, the government 
supports them in the land restitution process. Additionally, children of forcefully displaced 
families between 5 and 17 years old can enroll in public schools and are not charged tuition 
fees. Households with children under seven years receive a monthly subsidy of $20 dollars 
for nutrition, additionally for every child enrolled in primary school families receive $6 
dollars every month, and if the child is enrolled in secondary school $12 dollars (_, 2006). 
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The aid provided by the government through the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program is 
aimed at stabilizing the households while they recover from displacement and helping 
them keep their children enrolled in school through a small incentive.  
Besides government aid, networks play an important role for families after 
displacement. Families’ adaptability to new environments can be less traumatic if they have 
relatives, friends or organizations that indicate how things work at the destination place. 
The probability of having access to government aid is higher if people help them getting all 
the paperwork necessary to prove their displaced condition. Access to government aid 
spreads through word of mouth given that these people sometimes arrive clueless to the 
cities escaping from violence in their places of origin. That is why the Catholic Church is a 
key player during displacement, because for most families, it is a safe place to seek help and 
get instructions on what follows.  
IDPs usually move several times after their initial displacement because they can 
move from rural areas to small towns where there is low capacity of absorption in the labor 
market and they move to larger towns or cities where there are more opportunities. 
Networks help inform IDPs where the better opportunities are which ends up being the 
large capital cities of the departmentos. 
Political participation represented by voting indicates that households are not 
apathetic from their communities or disengaged from the national sphere. Voting can 
indicate that households are interested in the well-being of their communities. On the 
negative side, it is common in Colombia for politicians to buy votes through coercion or by 
making false promises. Rural communities are often victims of this crime as they are 
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threatened by political leaders to vote for a certain candidate in order to prevent further 
violence. For example in political campaigns for senate or even presidential elections IDPs 
are said that they will no longer receive government aid if they did not vote for a certain 
candidate (_, 2010).  
Survey results show that before displacement 65% of adults voted compared to 
58% after displacement. Results include voting at local and national levels35. One of the 
consequences of displacement is that people do not register their identification at the 
destination municipality loosing voting privileges and thus political participation; 
furthermore, during the adjustment process at a new destination, IDPs are not familiarized 
with local politicians and have no interest in participating. As the time of displacement 
increases, people can have an incentive to participate in local elections and integrate to 
their new community.  
In addition to political participation through voting there are activities where people 
can integrate directly in their community, for example religious, peasant, sports or cultural 
organizations. Community participation reflects the engagement with the community, 
community leadership and stronger social networks with other members. Furthermore, 
depending on the role a person plays in the group he/she can influence other people and 
instances. Participation can have a positive effect after displacement because a person can 
integrate to the same group at the destination municipality which in turn can help them 
establish smoothly in a new environment. On the negative side, organization leaders have 
been a target of illegal groups at their places of origin because these organizations attack 
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 In order to vote in Colombia your identification has to be registered at the closest polling station. 
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leaders in order to coerce people in the community. These leaders are usually among the 
first victims of violence and they and their families have to leave fast. In other situations 
community leaders are kidnapped or murdered because they face violent actors leaving 
their families adrift.   
Voting and community participation can have ambiguous effects on internal 
displacement because, on the positive side, it shows engagement and the building of 
networks but on the negative side these people can become targets of illegal actors and are 
forced to displace after someone is attacked. Survey results show that before displacement 
67% of the adults did not belong to religious, community, cultural or sports organizations, 
15% attended meetings, 11% attended meetings and participated actively and 7% held 
leadership positions in their groups. After displacement 68% of the people did not belong 
to any of the above-mentioned organizations, 17% attended meetings, 9% attended 
meetings and participated actively and 6% held leadership positions in their groups. The 
results indicate that after displacement people do not participate in community 
organizations probably because during the adaptation process they have not integrated to 
their new communities or because the groups they belonged to disintegrated after 
displacement. Additionally, there are a high number of people who do not engage in 
community activities which can decrease the chances of having stronger networks at their 
destination communities. Finally, according to the survey results, 70% of the IDPs 
answered they had family or friends at the destination municipality which shows the 
importance of building networks once people are victims of forced displacement. 
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Household members’ education level has a positive effect on their children’s 
enrollment decision. Research has found that parents’ education has a significant and 
positive effect on the enrollment decision. Higher attainment is associated with more 
chances of their children being enrolled in school. As parents level of education increases, 
they perceive the positive effects although if they dropped out of school at an early age they 
may not perceive the benefits of education. Rural education in Colombia has been of low 
quality for a long period and parents who have experienced this situation do not see the 
benefit s of education. Moreover, if parents are employed in agriculture compared to other 
sectors, enrollment probability can diminish. However, after displacement, families whose 
children are enrolled in school receive a subsidy which is an enrollment incentive. This is 
how, although being a victim of forced displacement affects a household’s life in 
psychological and economic terms, an increase in enrollment can be a positive externality 
due to an exposure to better schooling opportunities for the children in the household.  
Due to the internal violent conflict in Colombia, children are often targeted by 
violent actors to enlist in their groups. Children are therefore protected by their parents in 
order to prevent participation in the armed conflict which affects their enrollment at 
school.  
According to the database results 78% of adults in the sample are literate indicating 
that they have some years of formal schooling. The survey does not register the individual’s 
highest educational attainment if they are not enrolled in school at the time of the survey. 
Parents’ years of education or highest level attained could be better proxies of their 
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contribution to children’s education in order to observe how each additional year or level 
affects enrollment probability. Parents’ literacy can partially explain the effect.  
The effect of health on enrollment has been analyzed by researchers. Studies have 
shown that poor health can have a negative effect on enrollment and attainment. Glewwe 
(2002) shows that poor nutrition affect children’s school attendance given its effect on 
health. Glewwe uses children’s height corresponding to his or her age as an instrument for 
health and concludes that child nutrition has to be addressed in order to increase the 
success probability in school attainment.  
Qualitative research on the enrollment decision has shown that transportation costs 
are a burden for school attendance. Children’s tuition and fees are covered by the public 
schools system but transportation costs are much higher than the schooling subsidy given 
to households. School assignment is administered by each municipality which leads to 
considerable heterogeneity in the process, for example Bogotá has an efficient system that 
assigns children to a school after filling an online form, other cities still have processes that 
include long lines and bargaining for a seat at a nearby school. Both systems have 
advantages and disadvantages, for example Bogota’s system can be very efficient in 
assigning the closest school but a computer illiterate, which can be the case for rurally 
displaced families, may prefer not to face this situation. The education secretariats have 
people assigned for assistance and computer terminals but the process can be 
overwhelming. In cities where the process in manual, people have to wait long hours in 
order to be attended and parents do not have the time to go through it. Additionally, people 
who have more experience usually get the seats at the closest schools. The heterogeneity in 
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Chapter 6: Factors that determine school enrollment at destination 
 
 
Displacement is an exogenous effect on people’s lives that usually live in rural areas 
and makes them migrate to other places in order to protect their lives. IDPs have to 
resettle, often under precarious conditions, and rebuild their lives. In general, ID families 
do not have the time to plan their resettlement and they are forced to leave their assets at 
their places of origin. Additionally, ID families often face violent acts that result in 
displacement leaving profound scars in their psyche. With these issues affecting them, ID 
families have to face the reality of finding food and shelter rapidly.  
The speed at which families have to respond in lieu of the events gives valuable 
information on the determinants of decisions such as education. Once families stabilize 
(secure food and shelter) they move on to make important decisions related to securing 
their economic sustainability at the destination place. Forced displacement thus resets 
families’ lives and it is a valuable exogenous effect that gives information on the importance 
of conditions such as income, parents’ education, previous education, time of displacement 
and distance from the municipality of origin on the decision of children’s enrollment in 
school after displacement.  
Empirical Strategy – Probit Model 
 
 
The determinants of enrollment can be analyzed using a probit model. I will look at 
enrollment instead of attainment because enrollment shows current investments on a child 
whereas attainment reflects the history of enrollment over a child’s life. Families’ past 
decisions are a result of the surrounding environment, perception of innate abilities of 
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children and cultural factors and being exposed to a new environment could affect the 
enrollment decision independently of previous decisions.  
 In a probit model, the probability of enrollment –and its determinants is modeled in 
the following way: 
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  (                ) where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of   . 
Assuming that the probability density function (PDF) of    is symmetric or is the standard 
normal distribution,     (   ), the model is called the probit model.  
The probit model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The 
likelihood function is the conditional density of   
 given    , treated as a function of the 
unknown parameters   . The ML estimator is the value of      that maximizes the 
likelihood function. Therefore the MLE is the value of      that best describes the full 




The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of the probit model rests on the strong 
assumption that the latent error term is normally distributed and homoscedastic. The ML 
estimator is inconsistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and robust covariance 
estimators cannot solve this. Several semi-parametric estimation strategies have been 
proposed that relax the distributional assumption about the error term.   
The coefficient interpretations from the probit model are not intuitive because they 
measure the change in the unobservable    associated with a change in one of the 
explanatory variables so marginal effects are a good alternative to simplify the 
interpretation.  
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 where F is the CDF of a standard normal random 
variable. 
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What are the key explanatory variables in the case of displacement? Looking back at 
the literature on the determinants of enrollment, there are two major forces that affect the 
probability of school enrollment after displacement. On the one hand, families’ economic 
conditions are such that they need additional income and children in the household may 
have to join the labor force in order to supplement household income. As a result, families 
may decide not to enroll their children in school. On the other hand, displacement to urban 
municipalities –which often happens – offers more options to families in terms of less 
distance from the house to school, making it less expensive for parents to enroll their 
children in school.  
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Factors determining the enrollment of internally displaced children at the 
destination municipalities 
 
This section presents individual level estimates of the various factors affecting 
school enrollment of ID children in Colombia. Probit regressions were used for the 
estimates of whether children are enrolled in school because the school enrollment choice 
of interest is a binary variable. The estimated marginal effects, evaluated at the means, are 
presented in Table 5.  
The results presented in Table 5 show the marginal effects as well as the standard 
errors, which have been corrected for robustness. The first column reports the results for 
the overall sample of children, aged from five to seventeen. The second column shows the 
estimation results of the probability of enrollment for children between five and eleven 
years of age. The third column presents results for children between twelve and seventeen 
years old. 74% of children between 5 – 17 years old are enrolled, in the 5 – 11 age group 
75% of children are enrolled and in the 12 – 17 age group 72%. 








        
Enrolled before displacement 0.257  0.148 0.320 
  (1.287) (2.251) (1.468) 
Female (=1) 0.014  -0.005 0.034 
  (0.025)   (0.035) 
Age -0.022 ** 0.049 ** -0.078 ** 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) 
Ethnicity (ref=mixed)       
Indigenous 0.122 ** 0.102 0.139 * 
  (0.055) (0.066) (0.078) 
Afrocolombian 0.001  0.059 -0.052 
  (0.034) (0.041) (0.050) 
Female headed household -0.081 ** -0.08 * -0.061 
  (0.029) (0.044) (0.040) 
Head of household literate 0.115 ** 0.006 0.195 ** 
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  (0.034) (0.047) (0.045) 
Health problems (ref=no problems)       
Fever/Diarrhea 0.068 ** 0.064 0.069 
  (0.032) (0.043) (0.046) 
Respiratory problems 0.027  0.062 -0.001 
  (0.051) (0.061) (0.076) 
Heart problems/High blood pressure -0.124 -0.534 ** 0.010 
  (0.191) (0.273) (0.259) 
Injury 0.033  0.025 0.051 
  (0.047) (0.069) (0.061) 
Mental illness/Permanent disability -0.126 0.000  -0.059 
  (0.124) 0.000  (0.143) 
Household Registered in FA for IDPs 
Program 0.143 ** 0.136 * 0.152 ** 
  (0.038) (0.060) (0.054) 
Months displaced (ref=0 to 6 months)       
6-12 months 0.089  0.053 0.091 
  (0.099) (0.162) (0.123) 
12-24 months 0.295 ** 0.371 ** 0.263 ** 
  (0.077) (0.126) (0.101) 
24-60 months 0.349 ** 0.361 ** 0.368 ** 
  (0.069) (0.118) (0.088) 
more than 60 months 0.377 ** 0.365 ** 0.413 ** 
  (0.071) (0.124) (0.091) 
Household participates in Income 
generation program 
-0.056 * -0.114 ** -0.024 
  (0.031) (0.050) (0.041) 
Number of children in the household -0.013 -0.038 ** -0.008 
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Number of adults in the household -0.011 0.002 -0.013 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) 
Head of Household Voted before 
displacement 
-0.059 * -0.036 -0.078 * 
  (0.030) (0.045) (0.041) 
Community participation before 
displacement (ref=none)       
Attended meetings -0.018 -0.015 -0.032 
  (0.037) (0.056) (0.053) 
Participated 0.079 ** 0.026 0.102 * 
  (0.038) (0.057) (0.048) 
Leadership position -0.027 -0.077 -0.009 
  (0.056) (0.074) (0.081) 
Know people at destination municipality? -0.052 * -0.015 -0.096 ** 
  (0.029) (0.044) (0.038) 
Distance from origin 0.000 ** 0.000  -0.001 * 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Comes from rural municipality 0.005  0.052 -0.035 
  (0.029) (0.044) (0.039) 
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Planning to return? 0.058  0.053 0.099 ** 
  (0.039) (0.051) (0.050) 
Child employed after displacement? -0.099 ** -0.109 * -0.120 ** 
  (0.035) (0.056) (0.049) 
Household's Income quintile (ref=lowest 
quintile)       
2nd income quintile 0.063  0.032 0.121 * 
  (0.041) (0.061) (0.057) 
3rd income quintile 0.025  -0.036 0.085 
  (0.043) (0.071) (0.058) 
4th income quintile 0.102 ** 0.104 ** 0.129 ** 
  (0.039) (0.054) (0.055) 
5th income quintile (highest) 0.123 ** 0.106 ** 0.167 ** 
  (0.039) (0.056) (0.052) 
        
        
N 1,374 555 816 
        
Pseudo R squared 0.151  0.185  0.232  
        
        
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05 
 
The enrolled before displacement coefficient shows that being enrolled before 
displacement does not appear to be statistically significant in affecting the enrollment 
decision after displacement. The displacement is an exogenous shock that makes 
households reconsider and change enrollment decisions. Priorities have to be re-evaluated 
and decisions about children’s school enrollment made before displacement – when 
families lived under different conditions – no longer apply. Families have to re-assign their 
resources in order to maximize their utility after the displacement’s shock and the previous 
enrollment decisions may not be sustained. 
Gender is also not a significant determinant of enrollment after displacement, a 
result that contrasts with those of other studies indicating the importance of gender on 
enrollment in, for example , rural China (Song, Appleton, & Knight, 2006; Zhao & Glewwe, 
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2010), Cambodia (Filmer & Schady, 2008), Turkey (Aysit, 2002), and Afghanistan 
(Guimbert et al., 2008). The indication is that displacement equally impacts boys and girls.  
Ethnicity is composed of three categories: mixed race, indigenous and 
afrocolombian. The results in Table 5 show that indigenous displaced children have a 
higher probability of being enrolled in school with respect to the mixed race category. 
Given that indigenous groups are an ethnic minority and their communities are very close, 
it is likely that when they are forced to displace, they move in groups to other areas of the 
country, which may facilitate their joint enrollment in school. Furthermore, indigenous 
groups in Colombia, since the Constitution of 1991, as afrocolombians, are included in 
affirmative action policies and they are aware of their rights. For these reasons, they may 
have a greater chance of being enrolled in school. On the other hand afrocolombians, 
despite having the same legislation as indigenous people encouraging their enrollment, do 
not have the social networks that may assist displaced families in allowing parents to send 
their children to school.  
Children who are members of a female-headed household have a lower probability of 
being enrolled in school. At the mean, the probability of enrollment decreases by 8 
percentage points compared to male-headed households. As shown in Chapter 5, 39% of 
the households in the sample are female-headed which significantly reduces the household 
income as women tend to have lower wages, female-headed status is associated with lower 
household income, which translates into a lower probability of children’s enrollment. 
Conversely women tend to join the labor market faster than men guaranteeing income for 
the family. Additionally, even though the Familias en Accion for IDPs aid is not targeted 
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specifically for women, they have to attend the health workshops. Usually women are the 
ones claiming the government’s aid at the different municipalities. The behavior of women 
has been extensively studied, so much that several conditional cash transfer programs only 
provide aid to female members of the households. The results show that even though the 
role of women is central for the well-being of family members, the fact that households 
loose a parent affects negatively its financial stability thus allowing children to join the 
labor market. When the results are disaggregated by age, the younger age group continues 
to have a negative and statistically significant coefficient but for 12-17 years old children, 
the effect is not statistically significant, which suggests that younger children depend more 
on the mother’s support and older children can, for example, join the labor market and 
bring additional funds to the household, under the income pooling assumption. 
Head of household literacy is a proxy for the head of household education. In 
Colombian rural areas, the quality of education has not been the best, as discussed in the 
background chapter of this dissertation, and it has generated a gap between rural and 
urban education. Therefore, being literate is a proxy for attending some years of school in 
rural areas, considering that a majority of internally displaced households come from rural 
areas. Additionally, given that parents are literate, they can be able to prepare the 
paperwork necessary to register their children at school. The estimated coefficient shows 
that, at the mean, the probability of enrollment increases by 11 percentage points if the 
head of household is literate. This result is even stronger for 12-17 years old children: the 
probability of enrollment increases by 19 percentage points at the mean.  
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Health problems can affect school enrollment because families prefer not to send 
their children to school if they are not in good health. The health problems coefficient is 
analyzed by a series of dummy variables, where “did not have any health problems in the 
last twelve months” was the base category. None of the health problems included in the 
survey have a negative effect on the enrollment decision with exception of the permanent 
disability or mental illness categories, which reduce the probability of enrollment at the 
mean by 24 percentage points. The other categories, fever/diarrhea, respiratory problems, 
heart problems/high blood pressure or injury have negative coefficients but are not 
statistically significant. Despite the lack of influence of the health-related variables in Table 
5, health problems can be associated with delayed enrollment as Glewwe (Glewwe & 
Jacoby, 1995) finds in the case of malnutrition in low income countries. The impact of 
health on school overage will be discussed later. 
Displaced families who are beneficiaries of the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program 
receive an economic incentive if they enroll their children in school. As discussed before, 
families receive bimonthly USD $16 per child in primary school and USD $31 per child in 
secondary school. As the coefficient on the registered in Familias en Accion Program 
variable shows, the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program appears to have a strong, positive 
effect on school enrollment. For those registered in the program, a child has, at the mean, 
14 percentage points higher probability of being enrolled in school.  
Note that families have to overcome sometimes difficult hurdles in the enrollment 
process for the Familias en Accion for the IDPs Program, given that they have to fulfill the 
requisites established by the respective municipality’s Education Department, 
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requirements which include showing proof of their displaced status, getting a seat at a 
public school in order to not pay tuition and obtain the uniform costs and schooling 
material exemption. This process can be very complicated. If families do not know their 
rights, and they are going through a time where they could have suffered human rights 
violations, they can give up easily before being able to enroll their children at school. The 
fact that the program still shows a strong positive effect on enrollment suggests the 
strength of its importance for the displaced families. 
Municipalities that have received a considerable number of displaced families have 
established an Unidad de Atención al Desplazado – UAO (Attention Unit for the Displaced) 
which provides assistance and centralizes several of the processes IDPs have to go through 
in order to establish in a new municipality. However UAOs are not established in all 
municipalities because it requires an investment that smaller municipalities are not able to 
cover. This unveils another issue with displaced families: they often go through several 
displacements before settling in another place because of the lack of opportunities in small 
sized municipalities that, as discussed above, are not able to integrate them into their 
community because of lack of opportunities or because of the costs associated with it.  
Families wander through the country until they are able to find a place and this is 
linked to the months displaced variable that captures the effect of for how long have 
families been displaced. The results show that after a year, at the means, children’s 
probability of enrollment increases by more than 30 percentage points with respect to the 
first six months. The fact is that families encounter serious adjustment difficulties during 
the first year after displacement, difficulties that reduce children’s enrollment.  They have 
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problems in settling in a destination municipality, moving through several places before 
settling. Furthermore, ID families are often in survival mode during the first few months 
after displacement, with serious nutrition issues, no source of income, concerns about 
safety, and a lack of knowledge of new surroundings. In this situation, the enrollment of 
children may become a secondary consideration. 
In addition to ID households being registered in the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program, a third of the surveyed families are part of an income generation program funded 
by USAID and Colombia’s government. The results show that the children of households 
participating in the income generation program have a lower probability of being enrolled 
in school. Evaluated at the sample mean, the enrollment is six percentage points lower for 
families participating in the income generation program. This is perhaps an unexpected 
outcome of a program that is intended to raise the income of displaced families. However, 
the program could have two adverse effects on the school enrollment of children. First, 
families participating in the program may decide to include their children in the income 
generation activities supported by the government, which raises child labor and reduces 
enrollment. In addition, the increased employment of household members may require 
that children stay at home to take care of older adults or younger siblings, which again 
reduces enrollment rates. In any case, this result points to a potentially serious side effect 
of the income generating programs promoted by the government. From a policy 
perspective, the conditions for participation could be revised in order to include a clause 
that requires children of these households to be enrolled and attend school.  
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There are several variables that encompass the effects of having political or social 
networks before or during displacement. First, vote before displacement asked household 
members if they voted in public office elections at their municipalities of origin. The 
coefficient shows that the probability of school enrollment decreases by 6 percentage 
points at the mean if adult household members voted before elections.  This result may be 
explained by the fact that persons who were more involved in political activity in the origin 
may also have been specially targeted in those communities and their families may have 
been more seriously affected, both in terms of material losses (in wealth, property, etc.) or 
in terms of personal losses (being victims of violence). These forces would disrupt their 
children’s’ enrollment processes long after being displaced. 
Participation in community activities could reflect the ability of the family to interact 
with others and develop social networks. The coefficient on this variable reported in Table 
5 shows that overall participation in community activities in the origin (which may reflect a 
general ability of family members to develop those networks outside the community as 
well) was positive in the enrollment of displaced children. Belonging to sport, cultural or 
religious organizations in the origin may be correlated with these activities in the 
destination, making easier the resettlement process and facilitating school enrollment. 
Note, however, that holding leadership positions in these community organizations may 
again be a proxy for political targeting and, as the coefficient on Table 5 reflects, could have 
a negative impact on the family and its children. Finally, knowing people at the destination 
municipality has a negative effect on the enrollment of children.  
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Two variables aim to capture the effects of the extent to which the family’s 
uprooting because of displacement affect their children’s school enrollment. The first one 
involves the response to the question of whether families intend to return to their places of 
origin (planning to return). The coefficient reported on this variable in Table 5 indicates 
that, holding other things constant, families that have been uprooted from their original 
communities have no intention to return home, tend to have lower school enrollment rates. 
Families that anticipate returning home, which means they may not have been uprooted 
from communities of origin, tend to have higher enrollment rates. Distance from the 
municipality of origin (ln of distance from origin) tends to reflect the degree to which the 
family has been uprooted, with those families which move longer distances facing more 
distant and difficult environments. The coefficient reported on this variable indeed 
suggests that, for older children, being located farther away from the origin  
Child employment has a negative effect on school enrollment. The negative effects of 
child labor on schooling are well documented and reflect the fact that poor parents 
generally require the children to spend time at work, which reduced the time availability to 
school and, therefore, reduces school enrollment. Brown, Deardorff and Stern discuss three 
reasons that drive poor parents to choose to send a child to work instead of school, 1) the 
discount rate of poor families are higher than other families, 2) the return to education for 
a poor child is lower than for average children and 3) the parent’s initial endowment is low 
relative to their child’s future income (D. K. Brown, Deardorff, & Stern, 2008). Basu argues 
that “child labor is intricately linked to poverty. Virtually all the world’s laboring children 
are located in poor countries” (Basu, 1999). Catwright (Grootaert & Patrinos, 1999) 
investigated child employment in rural and urban Colombia and stated that poverty plays 
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an important role in driving children to work. A similar negative relationship between 
poverty and child labor were also found in Bolivia (Grootaert & Patrinos, 1999). According 
to Ray (2000), when a Pakistani household falls into poverty, the child’s involvement in 
paid employment increases by up to 500 hours annually. The results presented in Table 5 
show that the probability of school enrollment among displaced children decreases by nine 
percentage points if a child is employed.  
Household income also plays an important role in the enrollment probability. 
Families with higher income can afford school enrollment of their children, whether it is 
associated with the affordability of tuition and fees, and transportion costs, etc. In Table 5, 
the income distribution of the ID households is divided into income quintiles. The results 
show that if a household belongs to the first three income quintiles, the probability of 
enrollment does not increase significantly and is not statistically significant. On the other 
hand if the household has greater income, belonging to the fourth and fifth income 
quintiles, the probability of enrollment increases by 10 and 12 percentage points at the 
mean. Families in the highest income quintiles are able to secure their children’s 
enrollment at school whereas families in the lower income quintiles face greater challenges 
in sending their children to school.  
Bivariate probit with sample selection bias 
 
A common issue in the estimation of behavioral relationships is sample selection 
bias that arises from missing data problems. J. J. Heckman (1979) presented a consistent 
estimation method that eliminates the specification error for the case of censored samples. 
The author shows that sample selection bias may arise for two reasons. “First, there may be 
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self-selection by the individuals or data units being investigated. Second, sample selection 
decisions by analysts or data processors operate in much the same fashion as self-
selection” (J. J. Heckman, 1979). Sample selection deals with the unobservables which 
means that deals with uncontrolled sample differences that affect the families’ decisions 
and their consequences. Moreover, a common cause of missing data is that “the subjects 
themselves act in a way that makes it impossible to obtain measurements on certain 
variables” (Dubin & Rivers, 1989). 
The probability of enrollment of ID children could be affected by sample selection 
because of a correlation with a dependent variable; in this case, people who submit their 
application for their admission to the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program could self-select 
because they know beforehand that they fulfill the requirements established by the 
program. Additionally, there could be a small amount of people who do not fulfill all 
requirements but are willing to try and submit an application and are admitted to the 
program. Therefore, on one side, not all IDPs go through the admission process to the 
Familias en Accion for IDPs Program, and on the other side, there are some IDPs who go 
through the process even though they do not meet all requirements, which translate into 
sample selection bias in the estimations.   
The outcome equation looks at the probability of enrollment of school-aged ID 
children in Colombia based on individual and household characteristics. The selection 
equation estimates the probability of being enrolled in the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program also based on individual and household characteristics. 
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The outcome equation is given by an unobservable level of utility Wij to alternative j 
for decision maker i. In this case, the household will maximize an aggregate welfare 
function as discussed in the theoretical framework. If the utility were observable, the 
regression would be expressed ̃     
  ̃      , where  ̃   includes the factors that affect 
choice. Given that utility levels are unobservable a regression method cannot be applied 
directly to the utility but rather to the alternative chosen by the decision maker (in this 
case the household) regarding the enrollment in school of their children.    
  
 ̃    ̃     
        , where      ̃    ̃   and            . Therefore, if    
   , the 
first alternative yields a higher utility level and it is selected, otherwise, the second 
alternative is selected. The alternatives are expressed as follows:  
    {
        
   
            
 
The selection equation is specified as follows:    
    
         so that y1i is 
observed if and only if y2i>0. The corresponding indicator of whether y1i is observed or 
censored is denoted y2i: 
    {
        
   
        
    
 
The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of the probit model rests on the strong 
assumption that the latent error term is normally distributed and homoscedastic. The 
following assumptions about the bivariate distributions of     and    : 
a. (       ) is independent of (       ). The CDF of (       ) is  (       ). This 
implies that explanatory variables are exogenously determined. 
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b. The observations (               ) are i.i.d. This implies that observations were 
obtained by random sampling of some population. 
c. If errors between the two probit models are independent from one another then 
they could be estimated separately. But what happens if: 
(          ) 
(          ) 
Meaning that the errors in each model have a component unique to that model    
and another part    common to both, making the error terms correlated. 
Although the normality assumption still holds the errors will be dependent. This 
condition makes a difference because this is the estimate of the joint probability 
of            . 
  (     )    (       
    )    (          
    ) 
  (     )    (       
    )    (          
    ) 
In the case that both random variables are independent, the joint probability is the 
product of the marginal probabilities, so if             were independent, then: 
  (            )   (    )   (   ) 
  (            )   (    )      (   )  
  (            )      (    )   (   ) 
  (            )      (    )      (   )  
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Because the two probabilities are not independent then it is required to calculate 
joint probabilities for non-independent events. 
  (            )    (      |     )    (     )
   (      )    (     |     ) 
To reach this, the joint distribution of the     has to be assumed. If the      are 
dependent then there is a bivariate joint distribution. The joint PDF of two standard-
normally distributed      is: 
    (       )  
 
           √   
 




   
     
          
    
)] where   is a correlation 
parameter denoting the extent to which the two      covary. Their joint CDF will be: 
    (       )  ∫ ∫   (         )
   
        
   
 
If    , then the two errors are independent and the   is reduced to two standard 
normal distributions. Conversely, if    , then the two errors are correlated and the 
probability of one variable will depend on the probability of the other. Moreover, if    , 
then the two variables are the same. Finally, if      then the two variables are exactly 
negatively related 
The   distribution allows the estimation of bivariate probit models assuming that 
errors are i.i.d. as a standard bivariate normal with correlation   which in turn helps make 
probability statements about     . This is expressed in the following way: 
     |              |           
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       |                |           
            |           
This is also expressed as           (         ).  
The log-likelihood function of the bivariate probit model is: 
    ∑{          (  
       
      )
 
   
    (     )     (  
    )    (  
       
      ) 
 (     )       (  
    )    (  
       
      ) 
 (     )(     )       (  
    )   (  
    )    (  
       
      ) } 
Where  (  
       
      ) is the bivariate standard normal CDF and ( ) is the 
univariate standard normal CDF. 
Limitations of Heckman’s Estimator 
The limitations of Heckman’s model have been discussed by several authors 
including, Dubin and Rivers (1989), Winship and Mare (1992), J. Heckman, Lalonde, and 
Smith (1999), and Briggs (2004). The authors identify two issues in their articles, one is 
that the estimator is very dependent upon the joint normality assumption; the second, 
discussed by Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) shows that there is an apparent 




“When the normality assumption is wrong, moreover, maximum likelihood 
estimates may be worse than simply using the observed sample mean” (Winship & Mare, 
1992). The Heckman model assumes that errors are homoskedastic and when this is 
violated the model yields inconsistent estimates.  
Compared to OLS, Heckman's estimates yield program effects that are closer to the 
experimental results. The Heckman estimates, however, often differ substantially from the 
experimental estimates and tend to fluctuate depending on which variables are included in 
the selection equation. The various estimates reported by Lalonde have large standard 
errors, mainly because of small samples; hence they are not a definitive appraisal of the 
Heckman methods. But this research strongly suggests that Heckman's method is no 
panacea for selection problems and, when its assumptions are not met, may yield 
misleading results” (Winship & Mare, 1992). 
Estimation Results 
 
Internal displacement in Colombia is a country-wide phenomenon that affects 
people from different regions. This makes it difficult for policy makers because of the 
diversity among regions in the country. The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program was 
implemented in 2002 in 622 municipalities3637 following Accion Social’s guidelines in order 
to adjust for the regional characteristics. As discussed in the last section, sample selection 
could be present in this analysis because families who are beneficiaries of the program 
fulfill all requirements but did not live in a municipality that offered aid, or did not know 
                                                     
 
36
 Colombia had 1,123 municipalities in 2011. 
37
 By 2005 the coverage expanded to 702 municipalities and by 2006 there was national coverage.  
103 
 
about the program and there are families who may not fulfill all requirements and submit 
an application and are admitted to the program. With Heckman’s sample selection model I 
will use the probability of being a Familias en Accion for IDPs Program beneficiary instead 
of using the people in the sample who were beneficiaries in order to account for 
households that could be program beneficiaries.  
The selection equation then estimates the probability of being a Familias en Accion 
for IDPs Program beneficiary as shown in Table 6.   
The selection equation show that, as in the probability of enrollment regression, as 
time passes the probability of both being enrolled and being a Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program beneficiary increase. As discussed in the literature review, the initial months are 
detrimental for quality of life because households are living a traumatic experience that 
forces them to resettle. As time passes, families are able to integrate to a new environment 
and if they qualify, even receive government aid which although is not enough for a family 
to live on it, it help families stabilize their income. 
Families participating in an income generation program have, at the mean, between 
13 and 15 percentage points higher probability of receiving the Familias en Accions for IDPs 
Program aid. This result is as expected because the income generation programs are 
channeled through the Accion Social Agency which also manages the funds for the Familias 
en Accion Programs.  
The variable comes from a rural municipality captures the effect of families that have 
had several displacements which is common for IDPs. The negative effect of coming from a 
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rural municipality shows that recently displaced people are at clear disadvantage 
compared to people who have gone through several displacements. 
Table 6 Marginal Effects at the Means of the probability of being in Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Ethnicity (ref=mixed)       
Indigenous 0.064 * 0.068 **   
  (0.034) (0.030)   
Afrocolombian -0.041 -0.043   
  (0.029) (0.033)   
Female headed household -0.005 0.014   
  (0.021) (0.020)   
Head of household literate -0.014 -0.019   
  (0.022) (0.022)   
Number of children in the household 0.010 * 0.010 *   
  (0.006) (0.006)   
Number of adults in the household 0.011 0.013 *   
  (0.008) (0.008)   
Months displaced (ref=0 to 6 months)       
6-12 months 0.175 ** 0.184 **   
  (0.065) (0.065)   
12-24 months 0.297 ** 0.320 **   
  (0.054) (0.055)   
24-60 months 0.353 ** 0.348 **   
  (0.050) (0.052)   
more than 60 months 0.271 ** 0.256 **   
  (0.054) (0.057)   
Household participates in Income generation program 0.131 ** 0.155 **   
  (0.023) (0.240)   
Head of Household voted before displacement 0.052 ** 0.040 *   
  (0.024) (0.024)   
Community participation before displacement (ref=none)       
Attended meetings -0.021 -0.013   
  (0.029) (0.030)   
Participated 0.012 0.058 *   
  (0.031) (0.027)   
Leadership position -0.020 0.027   
  (0.041) (0.038)   
Know people at destination municipality? 0.006 -0.007   
  (0.023) (0.022)   
Comes from rural municipality -0.038 * -0.050 **   
  (0.020) (0.020)   
Planning to return? 0.018  -0.072 *   
  (0.033) (0.046)   
Household's Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile)       
2nd income quintile 0.026  0.041   
  (0.032) (0.034)   
3rd income quintile 0.084 ** 0.109 **   
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  (0.031) (0.030)   
4th income quintile 0.047 * 0.059 *   
  (0.030) (0.032)   
5th income quintile (highest) 0.107 ** 0.123 **   
  (0.030) (0.030)   
        
Control of Destination Municipality no yes   
        
        
N 8,885 8,662   
        
Pseudo R squared 0.109  0.184    
        
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05 
 
Finally, the income quintile is associated with a higher probability of being a 
Familias en Accion for IDPs Program beneficiary. Higher income is associated with having 
higher initial endowments for example, education, assets and labor. Families belonging to 
the fourth or fifth quintile of income level probability of enrollment increases by 10 and 12 
percentage points at the mean.   
The next table shows the estimation results of the probit model with Heckman 
sample selection. The first column presents the coefficients of the outcome equation and 
the second column presents the coefficients of the selection equation.  
Table 7 Bivariate Probit Model with Heckman Sample Selection – Marginal Effects 
  Outcome equation 
 
Selection equation 
Variable (Enrollment probability) 
 
(FA Prog beneficiary) 
        
Enrolled before displacement 0.801 **   --- 
  (0.127)     
Female (=1) 0.033   --- 
  (0.099)     
Age -0.074 **   --- 
  (0.018)     
Ethnicity (ref=mixed)       
Indigenous 0.405   0.757 ** 
  (0.387)   (0.318) 
Afrocolombian -0.261   -0.057 
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  (0.182)   (0.186) 
Health problems (ref=no problems)       
Fever/Diarrhea 0.146   --- 
  (0.153)     
Respiratory problems 0.087   --- 
  (0.340)     
Heart problems/High blood pressure -0.392   --- 
  (0.521)     
Injury 0.203   --- 
  (0.203)     
Mental illness/Permanent disability -0.425   --- 
  (0.369)     
Child employed after displacement? -0.432   --- 
  (0.153)     
Female headed household -0.036   0.345 ** 
  (0.134)   (0.147) 
Head of household literate 0.363 **   -0.288 * 
  (0.156)   (0.164) 
Months displaced (ref=0 to 6 months)       
6-12 months 1.148 **   0.715 * 
  (0.553)   (0.388) 
12-24 months 1.520 **   0.767 ** 
  (0.493)   (0.305) 
24-60 months 1.805 **   1.136 ** 
  (0.455)   (0.277) 
more than 60 months 1.818 **   0.930 ** 
  (0.462)   (0.285) 
Number of children in the household -0.027   0.173 ** 
  (0.186)   (0.042) 
Number of adults in the household -0.022   0.188 ** 
  (0.051)   (0.056) 
Household participates in Income generation 
program 0.021   1.037 ** 
  (0.186)   (0.153) 
Head of Household voted before displacement -0.132   0.301 
  (0.198)   (0.162) 
Community participation before displacement 
(ref=none)       
Attended meetings -0.002   -0.150 
  (0.177)   (0.196) 
Participated 0.350 *   0.416 * 
  (0.199)   (0.226) 
Leadership position 0.244   -0.068 
  (0.274)   (0.288) 
Know people at destination municipality? -0.336 *   0.090 
  (0.161)   (0.153) 
Distance from origin -0.001 **   --- 
  (0.000)     
Comes from rural municipality 0.001   -0.358 ** 
  (0.160)   (0.153) 
Planning to return? 0.348 *   -0.276 
  (0.209)   (0.261) 
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Household's Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile)       
2nd income quintile 0.474 **   --- 
  (0.220)     
3rd income quintile 0.497 **   --- 
  (0.210)     
4th income quintile 0.361 *   --- 
  (0.194)     
5th income quintile (highest) 0.384 *   --- 
  (0.203)     
Destination municipality ---   yes 
        
        
n 1,629     
        
Rho 0.267     
  (0.267)     
Wald test of independence of equations (rho=0) Chi2(1)=0.90 Probability= 0.3418 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05 
 
 
The estimation of the probit model with Heckman sample selection show that the 
rho parameter is not statistically different from zero which means that the error terms of 
the outcome and selection equations are not correlated which indicates that there is no 
sample selection bias. The absence of selection bias confirmed as the correlation between 
the error terms of the two equations, as indicated by the fact that ρ (rho) in Table 7 output 
is not statistically significant. Rho is the correlation between the error terms of the 
outcome and selection models with a range between -1 and +1 and can indicate the range 
of selection bias. While a correlation value of 1 would occur if the regression coefficients of 
the selection model and the regression coefficients of the outcome model were estimated 
by identical processes, a value of rho closer to zero would suggest that data are missing 
randomly or the regression coefficients of the selection model and the regression 
coefficients of the substantive model were estimated by unrelated processes. 
Even though the results show the absence of selection bias there are variables that 
are very important for both estimations such as if the head of the household literacy, affects 
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positively and significantly the probability of being in the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
program and of children being enrolled in school. This result evidence the disadvantage of 
displaced families in having access to social services probably because of the paperwork 
required to access them. The challenge to policymakers is to focus on groups that are at 
clear disadvantage. The number of months that a household has been displaced also 
associated with a higher probability of both participating in the program and enrollment. 
This can be due to having settled down at destination municipalities and build networks 
that help transmit knowledge among a new community. Finally, income is also positively 
associated with both outcomes because implicitly it can be related to better education and 
less difficult conditions at destination municipalities.  
Bivariate probit – testing for simultaneity in the decision process  
 
In order to examine if the enrollment decision and the participation in the Familias 
en Accion for IDPs program decisions are interrelated I use a bivariate probit, following last 
section’s process, in order to estimate the joint probability and test the hypothesis that 
both models fit the data better than the separate models.  The intuition behind this 
estimation is the endogeneity in the probit estimation of the factors associated with 
enrollment given that the causality cannot be determined, are children enrolled at school 
because they have to comply with the Familias en Accion for IDPs program requirements or 
because families decide to. The bivariate probit estimation estimates both probabilities 
jointly assuming a joint distribution and thus a correlation between both meaning that the 
probability of one event will be dependent on the other event.  The Likelihood Ratio will, as 
in the previous estimation, show if probabilities are determined jointly.  
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conditional being in 




being in FA 
        
Enrolled before displacement 0.207   0.012 
  (0.934)   (0.455) 
Female (=1) -0.001   0.023 
  (0.380)   (0.340) 
Age -0.018   -0.004 
  (0.138)   (0.084) 
Ethnicity (ref=mixed)       
Indigenous 0.206   -0.099 
  (2.117)   (2.103) 
Afrocolombian -0.030   0.017 
  (0.220)   (0.233) 
Health problems (ref=no problems)       
Fever/Diarrhea 0.016   0.034 
  (0.613)   (0.505) 
Respiratory problems 0.095   -0.053 
  (0.908)   (0.935) 
Heart problems/High blood pressure 0.024   -0.094 
  (2.101)   (2.017) 
Injury -0.002   0.017 
  (0.281)   (0.255) 
Mental illness/Permanent disability 0.033   -0.094 
  (2.098)   (2.017) 
Child employed after displacement? -0.128   0.013 
  (0.362)   (0.261) 
Female headed household -0.014   -0.042 
  (0.763)   (0.650) 
Head of household literate 0.090   0.018 
  (0.590)   (0.352) 
Months displaced (ref=0 to 6 months)       
6-12 months 0.141   0.056 
  (0.985)   (0.891) 
12-24 months 0.337   0.089 
  (1.620)   (1.594) 
24-60 months 0.474   0.020 
  (0.859)   (0.950) 
more than 60 months 0.455   0.041 
  (1.137)   (1.197) 
Number of children in the household 0.019   -0.027 
  (0.408)   (0.394) 
Number of adults in the household -0.004   -0.010 
  (0.188)   (0.159) 
Household participates in Income generation program 0.026   -0.071 
  (1.172)   (1.094) 
Head of Household voted before displacement 0.055   -0.055 
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  (0.732)   (0.735) 
Community participation before displacement (ref=none)       
Attended meetings -0.038   -0.009 
  (0.277)   (0.168) 
Participated 0.061   -0.007 
  (0.273)   (0.136) 
Leadership position -0.019   -0.016 
  (0.342)   (0.262) 
Know people at destination municipality? -0.042   0.002 
  (0.180)   (0.074) 
Comes from rural municipality -0.015   0.027 
  (0.430)   (0.409) 
Planning to return? 0.115   -0.047 
  (0.730)   (0.739) 
Household's Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile)       
2nd income quintile 0.089   0.003 
  (0.342)   (0.186) 
3rd income quintile 0.131   0.000 
  (0.513)   (0.233) 
4th income quintile 0.110   -0.008 
  (0.329)   (0.192) 
5th income quintile (highest) 0.086   0.009 
  (0.407)   (0.240) 
        
        
Pr(enrolled=1,FA=1) 0.627     
  (3.382)     
Pr(enrolled=1,FA=0) 0.098     
  (2.062)     
n 1,276     
        
rho 0.156     
  (0.081)     
Wald test of independence of equations (rho=0) Chi2(1)=3.689 Probability= 0.055 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05 
 
The marginal effects of the bivariate probit model presented in Table x and of the 
two equations is statistically significant (the Likelihood Ratio Test for Ho:  ρ=0 against H1:  
ρ≠0 gave a p-value of 0.050) thus rejecting the hypothesis that the two dependent variables 
are not jointly determined, however the magnitude of the correlation is 0.156. 
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Even though the bivariate probit results show a statistically significant correlation, 
when estimating the joint probabilities, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. 
This indicates that, as in the bivariate probit with sample selection estimation, the first 
estimate of a single probit equation including the participation in Familias en Accion for 
IDPs variable is an appropriate approach. The results show a relationship between both 
decisions but being part of Familias en Accion for IDPs is not a necessary condition for 
enrollment. As discussed in the case of income generation programs, the length of 
displacement helps families stabilize the economic situation and smooth consumption, 
which coupled with better access to social services, offers households the possibility of 
considering sending their children to school. Familias en Accion for IDPs as income 
generation programs help families smooth their consumption during the first months but 
after a year families who are not registered in the programs are able to improve their 
quality of life conditions. What becomes an issue as discussed in the overage chapter is the 
negative effect of being overage as it increases the chances of quitting school. Therefore the 




Chapter 7: Effect associated with the participation in the Familias en Acción for IDPs 
Program 
 
Empirical Strategy – Difference-in-differences 
 
 
Given the characteristics of the data, the empirical strategy will look at the effect 
associated with the participation in the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program on enrollment 
using a difference-in-differences (DID) method. The database includes IDPs that are 
beneficiaries of government aid and non-beneficiaries, which will allow an identification of 
the policy effects on the enrollment decision.  
The DID method was introduced by Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card 
(1985) on their work on estimating the effect of training programs on earnings. The model 
set up includes the analysis of an outcome for two groups for two time periods. For 
example, one of the IDPs groups is exposed to a treatment (beneficiaries of the Familias en 
Accion for IDPs Program) in the second period but not in the first. The second group is 
comprised of ID households that are not government aid beneficiaries in any of the two 
periods. All households are asked about their children’s enrollment before and after 
displacement which will allow a calculation of the average gain in the non-beneficiaries 
group relative to the average gain in the beneficiaries group. “This removes biases in 
second period comparisons between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that could be the 
result from permanent differences between those groups, as well as biases from 
comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the result of trends” (Imbens, 
Wooldridge, & National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008). 
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An assumption of the DID model is that the average change in the enrollment 
decision is presumed to be the same for both the non-beneficiaries and, counterfactually, 
for beneficiaries if they had not participated. This means that unmeasured factors, for 
example changes in economic conditions or other policy initiatives, affect both the 
participants and the non-participants in similar ways. 
The difference in differences model is estimated following this model: 
                                 
Where: 
      is a binary enrollment decision made by the families 
    is a binary variable = 1 if the household is a government aid beneficiary, and = 0 if the 
household is non-beneficiary 
   is a binary variable = 1 for the moment after displacement and = 0 for the moment 
before displacement 
       is an interaction term where the product = 1 if the household is beneficiary of 
government aid after displacement and zero otherwise. 
     is the error term of the regression with variance  
  
The difference in differences estimator is then: 
    [    |          ]   [    |          ]   [    |          ]  
 [    |          ]  
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The above mentioned coefficient (  ) will show the policy effect on enrollment. The 
purpose of including this method is to reveal the impact of the Familias en Accion program 
on the families’ decisions. The survey includes information on the household’s conditions 
before displacement and after by asking them about their situation before and after 
displacement, which is represented as periods 0 and 1. 
Given that not all people were forcefully displaced at the same time and they have 
been displaced for different time periods there is heterogeneity in the effect of the Familias 
en Accion program. Displacement can be understood as a dynamic process because violent 
actors are constantly pressuring families out of their places of origin and it is not a single 
event that happened during a period and stopped. The fact that there are still violent actors 
causing the displacement of families from their places of origin justifies the understanding 
of the policies that have to designed in order to alleviate their vulnerability and stabilize 
them at the destination municipalities. As a result, the effect of government aid during the 
first months after displacement gives families the opportunity to have a less traumatic 
experience.   
Limitations of the DID approach 
 
 
Although the DID method has been extensively used there are some limitations to 
this approach. For example, the method requires pre-intervention data, which is not always 
available, because of the survey design. Additionally, the “identifying assumption in order 
to obtain the impact estimates is that the counterfactual trend is the same for treated and 
non-treated units” (Evaluating Actions of a Structural Nature - Evalsed, 2009) which 
requires more data availability. It could be for the exposed reason that the difference does 
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not show the intervention effect because beneficiaries are different from non-beneficiaries 
even if there is not government aid, which is selection bias. The mentioned selection bias, 
related to the time invariant individual characteristics, can be eliminated by subtracting the 
difference in outcomes before individuals are displaced from the difference after 
individuals are beneficiaries of government aid. This means that if what differentiates 
Familias en Accion Program beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries is fixed in time, the 
selection bias can be eliminated and thus produces an estimate of the intervention impact. 
Another identifying assumption establishes that the average change in the outcome 
would be the same for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries should they not have been 
eligible for government aid. This means that for example, changes in socio-economic 
conditions, affect both groups in the same way. Furthermore, in addition to this identifying 
assumption, the DID “employs the ordinary least squares estimator and, as such, is 
sensitive to the usual violations of the Gauss-Markov assumptions (such as 
homoskedasticity, normality, and no autocorrelation)” (Buckley, 2003). 
Effect associated with the participation in Familias en Accion for IDPs Program 
 
 
Colombia’s government policy response of to the internal displacement 
humanitarian crisis has been limited in the area of education. Although Law 387 of 1997 
recognized the humanitarian crisis and established that a policy for victims of violence 
should be put in place, this was not implemented immediately. It was only when the 
numbers of the displaced grew that the government was pushed to intervene. 
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It was during 2001-2002 that the number of IDPs increased significantly due to the 
civil conflict escalation. Peace conversations between president’s Pastrana administration 
and the FARC (the largest guerrilla group) were cancelled and the paramilitary groups’ 
attacks increased. The next table shows the number of IDPs by year according to Accion 
Social38. The spike in the number of IDPs from 2001 to 2002 gave greater visibility to the 
humanitarian crisis and forced the government to respond to it through the study of the 
phenomenon and the advancement of research on the topic.  
Table 9 Number of Internally Displaced Persons from 1998 to 2007 
Year Up to 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
IDPs (000’s) 98 105 121 278 403 462 267 247 282 303 338
Source: Accion Social  
Several studies (Ibañez & Velez, 2008; Kirchhoff & Ibañez, 2001; Sánchez, Ramos, & 
Forero, 2003) on internal displacement have identified the following as characterizing the 
IDPs: there are more women as heads of households, the incidence on children and the 
elderly is greater, internal displacement affects more strongly the indigenous and 
afrocolombian communities, insertion to the labor market is more successful for women, 
the education levels of the displaced population are lower compared to the total 
population, IDPs present post-traumatic stress disorders, and households have a higher 
dependency rate (Rodríguez Garavito, 2010).  
The government created the Sistema Nacional de Atención a la Población Desplazada 
(National System of Attention to the Displaced Population - SNAIPD) with the purpose of 
                                                     
 
38
 These figures only include IDPs who are registered in the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program. 
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articulating the various policy dimensions of the crisis, the national and regional 
interactions involved, and the financing of the program. The next graph illustrates the 
policy implementation plan (Forero, 2003) that summarizes the aid offered to the IDPs.  
Figure 7-1 Forced displacement prevention and aid policy process 
 
Is education a priority in this policy effort? According to the policy process, 
education belongs to the humanitarian aid stage which includes, water and hygiene, 
nutrition, shelter, health, employment and education is part of the social and human capital 
strengthening, but it is listed as the least important priority. 
In 2004, the Constitutional Court found that the implementation of policies 
regarding IDPs was insufficient. One of the aspects that had been inadequately considered 
was the access of displaced children to education. The Constitutional Court decreed, in 
Sentence T-025 of 2004, that IDPs should be guaranteed at least nine rights and that the 
State’s actions should be aimed to fulfill them. The rights established by the court are: right 
to life, right to dignity and physical integrity, right to a family and its unity, right to a 
minimum subsistence, right to health, right to be protected against discrimination, right to 
basic education until 15 years of age, support for self-sustainability, and right to return and 
reestablishment (Rodríguez Garavito, 2010).  
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The Constitutional Court intervention was a milestone regarding the rights of IDPs. 
Besides the deficiencies found by the Constitutional Court on rights; it found that the 
distribution of responsibilities between the national and regional levels was not clear and 
that the loopholes caused a lack of appropriate attention to IDPs. For this reason, it 
assigned specific areas of competency to the different levels, especially with respect to 
health and education. As a result, Sentence T-025 specifies that the Ministry of Education 
has to support the Municipal Departments of Education in the definition of policies and 
strategies regarding IDPs.  
The recognition of the importance of education by the Constitutional Court and its 
positive effects on government policies towards IDPs leads to the analysis of the effects of 
the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program on school enrollment. The ENHD survey includes 
information on both ID children who are beneficiaries of the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program and children who are not; it also includes information on whether children were 
enrolled at school in their municipality of origin and in the destination municipality. With 
these two variables I can define a treatment group that are those who receive the Familias 
en Accion for IDPs Program aid and the control group are children who are not aid 
beneficiaries. It is assumed that dealing with differences will remove biases in second 
period comparisons between the program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries that could be 
associated with systematic differences in the characteristics of the two groups.  
In order to review the effect associated with the participation in the Familias en 
Accion for IDPs Program, the following table compares the means of the enrolled children 
before and after displacement and the mean of the beneficiaries of Familias en Accion for 
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IDPs Program and non-beneficiaries. The associated effect of the program is 0.137, 
meaning that children who are beneficiaries of the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program are 
more likely to be enrolled in school.  










Source: ENHD  
The factor associated to the participation in the program can be analyzed through a 
levels equation with robust standard errors where the FA_ben (Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program beneficiary) is an interaction term that captures the effect of the program after 
displacement.  Additional controls are included given that the previous analyses had shown 
that there are variables such as head of household literacy or if the household is female-
headed that are important in determining school enrollment.  
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Table 11 Impact of Familias en Accion for IDPs on the probability of enrollment 
Difference in Difference Estimates
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
FA_ben 0.035 (0.021) * 0.036 (0.021) * 0.075 (0.027) ***
Income generation prg 0.011 (0.016) 0.012 (0.016) -0.009 (0.023)
Female headed household -0.020 (0.015) -0.020 (0.015) -0.027 (0.020)
Head of Household is l iterate 0.077 (0.019) *** 0.077 (0.018) *** 0.084 (0.024) ***
Months displaced (ref=0 to 6 months)
6-12 months 0.266 (0.059) *** 0.267 (0.061) *** 0.276 (0.071) ***
12-24 months 0.415 (0.048) *** 0.416 (0.049) *** 0.388 (0.058) ***
24-60 months 0.444 (0.045) *** 0.444 (0.046) *** 0.383 (0.054) ***
more than 60 months 0.463 (0.046) *** 0.463 (0.047) *** 0.394 (0.056) ***
Household's Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile)
2nd income quintile -0.004 (0.022) -0.004 (0.022) 0.035 (0.030)
3rd income quintile -0.017 (0.023) -0.017 (0.023) -0.029 (0.031)
4th income quintile -0.028 (0.023) -0.028 (0.024) -0.028 (0.032)
5th income quintile (highest) -0.063 (0.025) *** -0.063 (0.026) -0.044 (0.033)
N 3509 3509 3509
R-squared / Prob > F 0.551 0.551 0.019
Note: * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05, *** denotes significance at .01.
LR with fixed effects
Linear Regression with 
robust se
LR with clustered se
 
Regressions were also run with clusters in order to observe the standard errors. 
Given that the residuals could be correlated over time, clustering is one way of correcting 
for this correlation. Clustering changes the standard errors of variables that have group 
level variations more than those that have within group variation. Given that the two 
groups being compared are not very large, the effect is not significant. Additionally, the 
regressions were run with fixed effects in order to observe the standard errors.  
The results obtained using the DID approach show that children whose families are 
aid beneficiaries are more likely to be enrolled in school. These results are similar to the 
findings of Skoufias and Parker (2001), which show that Progresa, Mexico’s conditional 
cash transfer program (CCT) has a positive effect on enrollment. These authors implement 
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a double-difference (2DIF) empirical strategy and find that there are significant increases 
in school attendance accompanied by a decrease in work activities. These results are 
particularly important for children attending secondary school because they are more 
likely to attend school and participate in school activities as a result of Progresa.  
Given that additional controls were included in the estimations the effect of the 
Familias en Accion for IDPs effect, although significant, is not as important as for example 
the effect of time of displacement (measured in months). Throughout this dissertation the 
results have shown that both Familias en Accion and the income generation programs play 
an important role just after displacement but as time passes people are able to smooth 
their consumption and improve their quality of life at destination municipalities. From a 
public policy perspective these results show that government aid during the first year is 
determinant for the ID families’ well-being. These results also show that the programs are 
not having permanent effects on its beneficiaries because of several reasons, people 
depending on government aid are not interested in looking for more opportunities but 
rather to maintain their IDP status in order to continue receiving aid, in Colombia the 
number of families enrolled in the Familias en Accion program has increased significantly39 
in the last years. IDPs who do not declare their situation can also apply for the Familias en 
Accion for low-income people at destination municipalities which provide similar aid to 
families except the emergency humanitarian aid, thus, if families are not able to declare 
within the first year, once they are stabilized they can apply for the other program. Finally, 
head of household literacy has also been a factor associated with a higher probability of 
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 In 2012 there were 2.5 million families registered in Familias en Accion compared to 1.5 million in 2007. 
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enrollment meaning that people who are able to read and write move easier through the 
paperwork and are able to prepare documents for their declaration. Policymakers could 
focus on literacy campaigns for IDPs during the first year in order to improve their 
stabilization at destination municipalities. 
Just as Progresa, the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program is an effective demand-
side policy. If displaced families, because of economic difficulties associated with 
displacement or because of their perceptions about the low quality of education in 
destination areas, consider that returns to education are not high enough and that the 
opportunity – and other – costs exceed the benefits, they will decide not to enroll the 
household’s children in school. The government subsidy may provide enough incentive for 
the households to change their decision.  The research reported in this dissertation shows 
that this indeed appears to be the case with Familias en Acccion.
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Chapter 8: Overage 
 
Empirical Strategy – Ordered Probit 
 
 
The dissertation uses an ordered probit approach in order to look at the overage 
determinants of internally displaced children. Given that the overage variable is ordinal, 
the conditions for an ordered probit model adjust well to the expected analysis.  





  y in turn is generated by a latent variable y* that determines the values of the 
observed ordinal variable y. The continuous latent variable y* has several cutpoints and the 
value of y depends on whether a cutpoint is crossed. With respect to the overage variable, 
the latent variable y* is the number of years a child is over his/her age compared to a 
theoretical grade and y is the collapsed category for a group of years of overage. Now, 
assuming the index function         and assuming that there are k cutpoints: 
              
           
     
           
     
Then the conditional probabilities can be written like this: 
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where F is the cumulative distribution function of the residual ε that has standard normal 




Children coming from rural areas who are enrolled in school are frequently subject 
to overage, meaning that their age does not correspond to the grade they should be 
attending. Among the reasons for delayed enrollment, especially in rural areas, are the lack 
of access to school in rural areas, the economic burden of schooling for the families, and the 
lack of security in rural areas,  
Gross enrollment rates include in their measurement all children who are enrolled 
in schools regardless of their age while net enrollment rates take into account only children 
enrolled in school whose age group corresponds to the population of children of that age 
group. The gap between gross enrollment and net enrollment includes children who enter 
the schooling system at an older age than the one they are supposed to enter school, and 
children that have not been able to advance or have not been promoted from one grade to 
another. The group of children whose age is over the expected age for a certain grade is 
denominated overage.  
The overage variable is built using as a reference Article 67 of the Colombian 
Constitution that establishes compulsory education for children between five and fifteen 
years of age, which corresponds to one pre-primary year, five years of primary school, and 
three years of basic secondary school. On this basis, a predicted, on-time grade was 
assigned to children corresponding to their years of age, reflecting the grade they should be 
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in if they had entered school and promoted from grade to grade without any delays. In 
order to calculate the overage variable, the on-time, predicted grade was subtracted from 
the actual grade the children reported in the survey.  
Research was carried out to look at the determinants of overage among the 
displaced population. An ordered probit equation with five overage categories was used, 
where category 0 represents children that are underage or aligned with their grade, 
category 1 represents children who are delayed by a year, category 2 represents children 
who are delayed by two years, category three represents children who are delayed three 
years, and category four represents children who are delayed four years or more.  
Table 11 shows the regression results for each of the overage categories, which 
included 535 observations. The regressions were run using robust standard errors and the 
estimates reported are the marginal effects of each independent variable, holding others 
constant at the mean. Additionally, in order to validate the distribution cutoff points, a 
difference in means test was carried out that shows that these are different from each other 
and that all categories are necessary. The null hypothesis that the cutoff points are equal 
was rejected. In general, according to the probability of children being in the category of 
overage=x, the last row of the table shows that results follow a normal distribution with 
both overage = 0 and overage = 4 having the least probability and the middle categories 
having the highest probability.  
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Table 12 Ordered Probit Marginal Effects on Overage 
Coefficients - Overage
Independent variables 0 years 1 year 2 years 3 years  More than 4 years
Enrolled before displacement 0.069 *** 0.094 *** 0.010 -0.055 *** -0.118 ***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.009) (0.014) (0.031)
Female (=1) 0.037 *** 0.046 *** 0.001 -0.029 ** -0.055 **
(0.016) (0.020) (0.004) (0.013) (0.024)
Age -0.051 *** -0.064 *** -0.001 0.040 *** 0.076 ***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Ethnicity (ref=mixed) -0.016 ** -0.020 * 0.000 0.013 * 0.024
(0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.015)
Female headed household -0.039 *** -0.052 *** -0.004 0.031 ** 0.063 **
(0.017) (0.024) (0.005) (0.014) (0.030)
Head of household literate 0.045 *** 0.065 *** 0.009 -0.037 *** -0.083 **
(0.015) (0.025) (0.007) (0.013) (0.034)
Household Registered in FA program 0.026 0.037 0.004 -0.021 -0.046
(0.020) (0.030) (0.007) 0.016 (0.040)
Household Registered in Income -0.020 -0.025 0.001 -0.016 -0.030
generation program (0.018) (0.023) (0.002) (0.014) (0.028)
Number of children in the household -0.019 *** -0.026 *** 0.000 0.016 *** 0.030 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Number of adults in the household -0.017 *** -0.021 *** 0.000 0.013 *** 0.025 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)
Comes from a rural municipality -0.011 -0.014 0.000 0.009 0.016
(0.020) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015) (0.027)
Adults voted in elections before 0.039 *** 0.055 *** 0.008 -0.032 ** -0.070 *
displacement (0.018) (0.026) (0.008) (0.014) (0.037)
Community participation before -0.030 *** -0.037 *** -0.001 0.023 *** 0.044 ***
displacement (0.010) (0.013) (0.003) (0.008) (0.014)
Child employed before displacement 0.015 0.018 -0.001 -0.012 -0.021
(0.025) (0.028) (0.003) (0.019) (0.032)
Child employed after displacement -0.032 ** -0.045 ** -0.005 0.026 * 0.056
(0.018) (0.026) (0.007) (0.014) (0.035)
Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile) 0.016 *** 0.020 *** 0.000 -0.013 *** -0.024 ***
before displacement (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
Head of household employed in agric -0.038 ** -0.045 * 0.002 0.029 * 0.052 **
before displacement (0.021) (0.024) (0.002) (0.016) (0.026)
Income quintile (ref=lowest quintile) -0.006 -0.008 0.000 0.005 0.009
after displacement (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009)
y = probability of (overage = x years) 0.089 0.245 0.326 0.184 0.156
N 535 535 535 535 535
Note: * denotes significance at .10, ** denotes significance at .05, *** denotes significance at .01. 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
The highest estimated probability is concentrated on children having two years of 
overage after displacement which, considering that they are forced to leave their places of 
origin and resettle at a different destination municipality implicitly means that children 
will not be able to enroll in school during the displacement and resettlement process. 
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Additionally, effects for the overage = 0 and overage =1 category have the opposite signs 
when compared to effects on overage categories equal to 3 or 4. Conversely, none of the 
overage = 2 category regression results is significant, meaning that none of the 
independent variables affect the probability of having two years of overage but rather that 
given the displacement condition, most of the children are delayed by two years. 
Looking at the regressions results in more detail, the focus will be on the statistically 
significant outcomes. The probability that a child is not overage increases by 6.7 
percentage points if he/she was enrolled at school before displacement. This same 
probability increases by 9 percentage points for a child who is overage by one year. On the 
contrary, the probability that a child is overage by three years decreases by 5.3 percentage 
points if he/she was enrolled before displacement and by 11.4 percentage points if he/she 
is overage for four or more years. This means that households who recognized the 
importance of school enrollment have a lower probability of a higher overage.  
The gender (female = 1) variable, which was not significant in the probability of 
enrollment regressions reported earlier, shows a different result in this model. Girls’ 
probability of being overage by 0 or 1 year increases by around four percentage points. 
Furthermore, girls’ probability of being overage by 3 or more years decreases by 3 
percentage points (three years) and 5.5 percentage points (four or more years). These 
results show that in Colombia, contrary to what happens in other countries, girls who are 
attending school have a lower probability of being overage. This is not the case for other 
countries where girls are the ones who stay at home while boys are attending school. For 
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example, Mexico’s Progresa grants additional income to families that enroll the girls at 
school. 
If a household is female-headed, the probability of being overage, more than three 
years, increases by at least 3 percentage points. As in the previous results, female headed 
households have a clear disadvantage with respect to male headed households because it is 
possible that their household income is lower and children have to join the labor market in 
order to meet ends. 
Head of household literacy plays an important role in the probability of overage. If 
the head of household is literate, the probability of not being overage increases by around 5 
percentage points whereas it decreases the probability of being overage by around 5 
percentage points. Head of household literacy may reflect how parents who have received 
some education recognize the importance of school enrollment for their children. This 
result suggests that the efforts to increase the coverage of education have a multiplier 
effect over time because it is transmitted to the next generations via the enrollment of the 
children whose parents have benefited from more education. From a policy perspective, 
this result gives evidence of the importance of increased schooling for vulnerable 
population. 
Either if households are beneficiaries of the Familias en Accion for IDPs program or 
if they participate in the income generation programs do not have a significant effect on 
overage. These results show that overage cannot decrease by participating in either 
program. The Familias en Accion for IDPs program incentivizes enrollment but cannot 
change the amount of years a child is overage.  
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The household’s income and the head of household employment variables are also 
statistically significant in this analysis. The results show that an increase in the household’s 
income before displacement raises the probability of not being overage by around 2 
percentage points and the probability of being overage decreases by 2 percentage points 
also. Additionally if the household’s head was employed in the agricultural sector, the 
probability of not being overage decreases by around 4 percentage points and the 
probability of being overage increases by around 4 percentage points. These two results 
are related because jobs in the agricultural sector have lower wages, which translates into 
having children join the labor market instead of attending school, which in turn leads to 
school delays and overage. Household income is also important in reducing overage 
because households with higher income do not need to engage their children in the labor 




Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
Summary of findings 
 
 
The characteristics of displacement in Colombia, as described by Ibañez, are special 
because “contrary to what happens in countries like Rwanda and Sudan, where people are 
displaced massively and they settle in refugee camps frequently in another country, in 
Colombia displacements are mainly individual (households) and within the country” 
(Ibañez, 2008). 
Using the ENHD dataset, 2004, this dissertation has examined (1) how the children 
of internally displaced persons –aged five to seventeen-- are affected in their school 
enrollment decisions, (2) the effects of the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program, a program 
that seeks to assist internally displaced households, on school enrollment, and (3) the effect 
of various variables on the school overage of the children of internally displaced Colombian 
children aged five to seventeen.  
After displacement, families face situations that leave them in a vulnerable state, 
given the scarcity of available resources. An important percentage of IDPs fall under the 
poverty line and their efforts are therefore targeted at pooling their income. According to 
theory, this means that the unitary household model used in the literature may be the most 
relevant for this population, with displaced family members coalescing with their 
household head in order to maximize their scarce resources. Empirically, the analysis 
focuses on a set of variables –some associated with the head of household, others not—that 
influence the school enrollment of the children.  
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The main results of the analysis of the determinants of school enrollment are the 
following. First, children who are members of a female headed household have a lower 
probability of being enrolled in school. At the mean, the probability of enrollment 
decreases by 8 percentage points compared to male headed households. Due to gender 
differences in wages, female-headed households may have lower income, which then 
affects school enrollment. Secondly, the head of household literacy coefficient shows at the 
mean, that the probability of enrollment increases by 11 percentage points if the head of 
household is literate. This result is even higher for 12-17 year old children, for which the 
probability of enrollment increases by 19 percentage points at the mean. Thirdly, the 
months displaced variable captures the effect of for how long have families been displaced. 
The results show that after a year, at the means, children’s probability of enrollment 
increases by more than 30 percentage points with respect to the first six months. Finally, 
the results show that if a household belongs to the first three income quintiles the 
probability of enrollment does not increase significantly and is not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, for the fourth and fifth income quintiles, the probability of enrollment 
increases by 10 and 12 percentage points at the mean, respectively.  
The dissertation also focused on the analysis of the impact of government policies 
intended to alleviate the plight of the displaced.  The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program is 
the best-known of these policies and it was explicitly analyzed in the research. The Familias 
en Accion for IDPs Program assists families in the registration of their children in public 
schools in order to incentive attendance to school by the household’s children and it 
provides materials needed by the children such as school uniforms and textbooks. 
Additionally, families with children under seven years receive a monthly subsidy of $20 
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dollars for nutrition, and for every child enrolled in primary school families receive $6 
dollars every month, and if the child is enrolled in secondary school $12 dollars. The 
empirical analysis suggests that the Familias en Accion for IDPs Program has been 
successful in raising the enrollment rate of internally displaced children. 
The empirical analysis examined the effect of the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program on school enrollment using a DID model. The results obtained using the DID 
approach show that children whose families are aid beneficiaries are more likely to be 
enrolled in schools. Children’s probability of being enrolled in school increases by 5 
percentage points if they belong to families beneficiaries of the Familias en Accion for IDPs 
Program. 
The third area of research in the dissertation examined the determinants of the 
school overage of internally displaced children. This is a serious issue, as the disruptions 
affecting internally displaced families lead as well to a disruption of schooling that is linked 
to overage. The highest estimated probability of overage is concentrated on children having 
two years of overage after displacement which, considering that they are forced to leave 
their places of origin and resettle in another destination municipality, implicitly means that 
children will not be able to enroll in school during the displacement and resettlement 
process. The probability that a child is not overage increases by 6.7 percentage points if 
he/she was enrolled at schools before displacement. This same probability increases by 9 
percentage points for a child who is overage by one year. On the contrary, the probability 
that a child is overage three years decreases by 5.3 percentage points if he/she was 
enrolled before displacement and by 11.4 percentage points if he/she is overage four or 
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more years. This means that households who recognize the importance of school 
enrollment, reflected in higher enrollment rates before displacement, have a lower 
probability of a higher overage. In addition, it was found that female headed households 
have higher overage probabilities with respect to male headed households, that the head of 
household literacy plays an important role in the probability of overage outcome, and that 
if the head of household is literate, the probability of not being overage increases by around 
5 percentage points whereas it decreases the probability of being overage by around 5 
percentage points. 
There are some limitations to these results associated to the quality of data in 
Colombia. Information on IDPs is difficult to obtain because due to the characteristics of 
this group, people prefer to remain invisible at least until they feel they are not threatened. 
This database is valuable because it includes people who did not declare their status to the 
government agencies. Because of the nature of IDPs it is very difficult to have longitudinal 
information on them that would allow researchers to evaluate the effect of the Familias en 




Colombia’s education history is marked by substantial inequities. There is a sharp 
divide in quality between private schools, which tend to serve the wealthier populations, 
and public schools, which serve low-income households.  There is also a profound schism 
between rural and urban education. Rural areas are dispersed and have not benefited as 
much by school policies over the years, which have affected mostly those in urban areas.  
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The civil conflict that has permeated the country for decades has been concentrated 
in rural areas and has further promoted rural to urban migration. Displaced households are 
forced to migrate to urban environments without enough human capital to integrate to the 
different labor market they face in destination municipalities. Education is thus essential in 
the adjustment of families and their children to their new environments. Although different 
internally displaced households have different challenges in enrolling their children in 
school, this dissertation has found that, through programs such as Familias en Accion for 
IDPs, internally displaced children are offered an opportunity to enroll in school and have a 
chance to adapt to a new environment. However, an issue that was not examined in the 
dissertation –because of lack of data—is that they are enrolled in public schools or public 
subsidized schools that have differences in quality with the private elite schools. The state 
may have been able to increase the enrollment rates of the displaced children, but the task 
ahead is to improve quality of the public school system in order to make education a more 
effective means to combat the poverty among this population.  
There is a second issue that deserves attention. The length of the internal conflict in 
Colombia means that many displaced families may have settled permanently away from 
their home towns. Still, the underlying mission of government policies towards the 
displaced has been to ameliorate the misery suffered by the displaced under what is 
considered a temporary condition. The Familias en Accion for IDPs Program aid examined 
in this dissertation, for example, is temporary and if families are willing to return to their 
places of origin it offers financial assistance to recover what households lost back home.  
Additionally, income generation programs are also a mechanism that allows families to 
smooth their consumption after displacement through training and project financing. 
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However, due to the lasting conflict, families often prefer to settle at their destination 
municipalities instead of returning, even under severe poverty conditions. This indicates 
that policies have to consider resettlement plans in the cities. Last year (2011) the 
Colombian Congress discussed and approved the Victims and Land Restitution Bills whose 
main objective is to offer compensation and reparation to victims of violence perpetrated 
by violent actors. The Land Restitution Bill seeks to provide incentives for the victims of 
violence to return to their places of origin. But this process will advance at a slow pace 
because victims of violence have established themselves permanently in destination 
municipalities. Furthermore, victims of violence usually have to face their aggressors when 
they visit the land they were forced to leave. For many, the conflict still rages on.  
As the length of displacement increases people are able to establish and find their 
way at destination municipalities while policy is oriented at helping them return to their 
places of origin. The first year after displacement is very traumatic and families wander 
through different places until they are able to settle precariously in cities’ poor areas. If 
families are able to settle in a destination municipality the incentives for them to return 
start diminishing. Policymakers’ challenge is to minimize the impact of displacement in the 
quality of life of IDPs and promote their return if this is the objective.   
Internal displacement has had some profound impacts on Colombian education’s 
rural-urban gap. Results in this dissertation show that the enrollment rates of internally 
displaced children increase after displacement. Since many displaced families come from 
rural areas, the rural-urban gap has declined because of this. Internal displacement has 
generated an inflow of four million people to the cities (ten percent of Colombia’s 
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population), where these families –despite their status—are able to find greater schooling 
opportunities when compared to their rural areas of origin. The enrollment results 
established in this dissertation show that the displaced children have a higher probability 
of enrollment in the urban destination areas, which reveals that the conditions for school 
attendance in rural areas are still precarious.  So, internal displacement is a phenomenon 
that has unexpectedly closed the rural-urban gap not because of State’s efforts to bridge the 
gap, but because as IDPs end up in the cities they have access to better quality public 
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